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THE 



COMMAND 



BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL, 



A KEPLY TO "REMARKS ON FROTHINGHAM'S HISTORY 
OF THE BATTLE, BY S. SWETT." 



BY RICHARD FROTHINGHAM, Jr., 

AUTHOll OF A HISTORY OF THE SIEGE OF BOSTON. 



BOSTON: 

CHARLES C. LITTLE AND JAMES BROWN. 
1850. 



THE 



COMMAND 



BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL, 



A. EEPI,Y TO "REMARKS ON FROTHINGHAM'S HISTORY 
OF THE BATTLE, BY S. SWETT." 



\^\> 



,\^^' 



BY RICHARD FROTHINGHAM, Jr., 

AUTHOR or A HISTOEY OF THE SIEGE OF BOSTON. 




BOSTON: 

CHARLES C. LITTLE AND JAMES BROWN. 

1850, 

c/ 



PKINTET) AT THE OFFICE OF THE B09T0X POST, NO. 21 WATER STKEET. 



\ 



^<:^'^s'^ 



C M M A JS^ D 



BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. 



The preparation of a History of Charlestown — the occupation of 
leisure hours — led to large collections relative to the military events 
which occurred in the neighborhood of Boston at the commencement 
of the war of the revolution ; but as a full account of them did not 
appropriately belong to so local a publication, and as no work had been 
issued containing a narrative, in much detail, of these interesting events, 
it was thought best to prepare the volume now before the public 
entitled History of the Siege of Boston. The old subject of the battle 
of Bunker Hill was so directly in ray way that it could not be avoided ; 
and as an apology for adding another to the narratives of this event, I de- 
termined to construct it, as much as possible, from contemporary materials. 
In a faithful history of the battle, the question of command cannot 
properly be avoided. If it is not of the importance which many attach 
to it, still it is a curious question, about which there is much interest. It 
may be well, in the outset, to state clearly the matter at issue. The 
point is, was there a general officer detached to exercise a general com- 
mand in the battle ? There is great incongruity in the statements rela- 
tive to this. It is stated (by Dr. Whitney) that the detachment that 
fortified Breed's Hill was first put under the command of Gen. Putnam, 
that with it he took possession of this hill, and " ordered the battle 



4 THE COMMAND IN THE 

Irom beginning to end ; " or as another (Hon. John Lowell) states 
it, " General Putnam was detached for the purpose of fortifying it 
(^Bunker Hill,) and Colonel Prescott was placed under his orders." On 
the other hand it is stated, that the orders to fortify Bunker Hill were 
given to Colonel Prescott, that the redoubt was raised by troops under 
his command, and that at no time during the whole affair did he act 
under, or receive an order from, a general officer. These statements are 
conflicting and cannot both be true. It is these rival claims as to Put- 
nam and Prescott that constitute the delicacy and difficulty of the ques- 
tion. 

Whoever investigates this subject must determine the kind of evi- 
dence that will be allowed to influence, mainly, the decision. There are 
numerous statements of soldiers who were in the battle, which were 
made forty years or more after it took place ; after antipathy or gratitude 
had biassed them against or for their old commanders ; after what they 
had heard and had come to believe, had unconsciously become interwoven 
with impressions of what they saw ; and at a time of life, too, when 
exactness as to details of what took place so long before in such a scene, 
could not reasonably have been expected. These relations bear, in some 
points, the characteristics of tradition. They mostly harmonize as to the 
movements of companies or regiments, but differ, irreconcilably, on points 
bearing on the question of command. An argument, or an array of 
evidence, of equal authority and of equal positiveness, may be drawn out 
of this large reservoir in favor of Putnam, or of Prescott, or that there was 
no general commander, or that there was no command at all in the action. 
A somewhat laborious studj', and critical collation of these statements 
forced upon me the conviction, that they ought not to be relied upon as 
leading authorities, and that it was idle to expect to arrive at a satisfac- 
tory result by depending on such sources of information. Hence diligent 
search was made for contemporary matter. Much caution and discrim- 
ination, however, are necessary in using such material. The first rumors 
of events are as apt to be as inaccurate as reminiscences of those events 
prepared after years have elapsed. But these rumors are followed by 
relations more reliable, and it is material of this sort that is the most 
valuable for historical purposes. It was such material that was selected. 
There are, however, but few facts bearing on the question of command 
in the many contemporary documents I have examined. Yet wha-t is 
gleaned from them is important. Among the documents are letters from 
Generals "Ward and Putnam, and Col. Prescott. The facts they supply 
arc oil some points conclusive. 

Sti.l, in a volume designed to be a simple record of authentic facts, and 
in a narrative of tlie battle prepared without consciouts bias for or against 



BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. 5 

either Putnam or Prescott as the commander, a labored argument on 
the question of command seemed neither desirable nor proper ; and in 
disposing of it, it was thought best to state concisely, yet fairly, all the 
evidence of a contemporary nature relative to both that was known, state 
the conclusion it seemed to warrant, and leave the subject with the 
reader. This course, right or wrong, it is proper to say, after a remark 
of Mr Swett in the pamphlet which has occasioned this publication, was 
suggested solely by reflection on the authorities ; and the gentlemen to 
whom he alludes are hereby exonerated from all responsibility, even for 
a suggestion, on this subject. And the " invincible prepossession," which 
seems to puzzle Mr Swett, it will be indeed " useless to inquire" into' 
because it did not exist. One great reason for treating the subject in this 
way was, that the reader, with facts thus before him, might make up a 
theory to suit himself. This plan was, accordingly, carried out. And 
though Mr Swett is pleased to say that I labored " throughout a large 
portion" of the Siege of Boston to prove a certain " insignificant abstrac- 
tion," yet, if so, it was unconscious labor, and to say so is ascribing to 
the effort far too much design. The evidence is merely stated and left 
to speak for itself. The reader Avill find it to occupy seven pages. 

The conclusion reached is that there was no general commander, 
other than Gen. Ward, of the Bunker Hill battle. After quoting the 
evidence that bears in favor of Colonel Prescott, the following statement 
is made: — "The conclusion warranted by this evidence is, that the origi- 
nal detachment was placed under the orders of Colonel Prescott, and that 
no general officer was authorised to command over him during the battle." 
In other words, there is not only no evidence that a general officer was 
detached to exercise a general command, but contemporary authorities 
bear decidedly against such a conclusion. 

Mr Samuel Swett has published a pamphlet entitled— " JFAo was the 
Commatider at Bunker Hill. With Remarks on Frothiiigham' s History of 
the Battle, loith an Appendix," in which he labors to overthrow this 
conclusion, and to establish the position that General Putnam was the 
authorized and general commander. Mr Swett is one of the old partizan 
writers on this subject. He began to write at a time (1818) when there 
•was much excitement relative to the battle. The Analectic Magazine 
for February of that year had an account of it ; the Port Folio for March 
had General Dearborn's extraordinary article, which opened up the long, 
bitter, and not yet closed controversy about General Putnam ; Daniel 
Putnam's able and interesting letter sbon (May) followed, marked by 
curious anecdote as well as by the indignant rebuke which filial duty dic- 
tated ; General Dearborn (June) issued his "V^indication" with its impos- 
ing array of documents; in July, Hon. John Lowell made his thorough 



b THE COMMAND IN THK 

defence of Putnam's character, in the columns of the Centinel, and 
Hon. Daniel Webster, in the North American Review, contributed an 
invaluable article, drawing with indelible lines the characteristics of the 
battle, and defining, with remarkable accuracy, the positions of Putnam 
and Prescott; the subject had got mixed with party politics, and for 
six months the press had teemed with articles on one side or the other. 
It was, then, at an unfavorable period for healthy investigation, and 
after such a surfeit of the subject, that Mr Swett " from his attention 
to military subjects," "consented to describe the battle." He commenced 
his researches in July, finished them in August, and early in Septem- 
ber was ready to favor the public with his "Historical and Topographical 
Sketch of the Battle of Bunker Hill." This account made up, in great 
part, from oral or written communications of actors in the battle, and 
framed with the theory that General Putnam was the commander, was 
regarded as of a partizan character. It was immediately criticised unfa- 
vorably in the Boston Patriot, in a scries of essays which subsequently 
appeared in pamphlet form, in which the main object is to show that 
Putnam was not even in the battle. Mr Swett has continued his research- 
es, printed two editions of his history, and several times appeared in 
defence of it. His statements relative to the formation of the army and 
the battle have found their waj' into most of the books. It is no injustice 
to the authors of subsequent excellent accounts of the battle to remark — 
for it is acknowledged — that as to the details they do not go behind Mr 
Swett' s account. The narrative in the Siege of Boston does. It is based, 
as much as possible, on contemporary documents, and, in its details, will 
be found to differ in many respects from those of the same period in Mr 
Svvett's History. A study of the conflicting evidence relating to this 
subject, however, ought to excite charity rather than dogmatism; and 
it was no purpose in preparing the Siege of Boston to make of its pages a 
pillory of error for a respected pioneer enquirer. Let the language relative 
to him to be found there, say whether much was done at the poor business 
of disparagement, or whether just credit was withheld. Mr Swett, how- 
ever, has had possession of this field so long, that, perhaps, it is not 
strange he should regard facts which fearfully disturb old opinions as 
errors ; or that a conclusion as to the commander which conflicts with a 
prepossession which for thirty years has proved invincible, should be 
contested. But the spirit, tendency and ol^jcct of the "Remarks" ar^ too 
obvious to be misapprehended. 

A publication thus by one who has made the Bunker Hill battle his 
special study, who has written more on it than any one, and whose 
opinions, hence, carry with them a certain authority, seems to demand a 
reply. Silence, under such circumstances, might either be construed into 



BATTLE OF BUNKER HH.L. 7 

an insult to an older inquirer, or as doing myself the injustice of admitting 
the correctness of his strictures. Besides, those to whom I feel so deeply 
indebted for criticism as gratifying as it -was unlooked for, on a volume, 
which gradually and unexpectedly grew to the form in -which it appeared, 
and who have thus kindly commended it to the public, have a right to 
expect, that, when its integrity is seriously impeached, its author should 
show his vindication. Still, I undertake a reply with the greatest repug- 
nance to controversy.* In doing it, and doing it after all, mainly for the 
sake of history, what is merely personal will be set aside as of little 
account. It is not of so much consequence to the public how a writer 
carries his head, whether sometimes under his arm or always above his 
shoulders, as it is how he does his work. Besides, discourteous personal 
allusions do not strengthen a weak cause, and are sure to mar a strong 
one. 

It is difficult to observe method in dealing with this medley of accusa- 
tion. Mr Swett's zeal for his hero is so ardent, and his imagination is 
«o brisk, that he seems to have misapprehended the simplest language ; 
and hence, quite unintentionally it may be, he ascribes to me views I 
do not express, facts I do rfot state, and opinions I do not hold. He is 
merry over mistakes that have not been committed, and is indignant at 
charges that have not been made. Where, for instance, in the Siege of 
Boston, is it written that the *' great battle of Bunker Hill was fought 
on our side by a headless mob r" Where do I say that it is difficult to 
assign a "motive" for this conflict? Where is adduced " the most incon- 
trovertible argument in the world," or is it even stated, that the army at 
Cambridge was "itself a mob?" What " mistake of law" is made where 
it is said that Warren had not received his commission ? What charge is 
made against Col. Sargent ? Where is it stated or intimated that General 
Putnam was " a mere volunteer" in the army at Cambridge ? Where is 
it said that "he could not possibly" command at Bunker Hill, because it 
was an army of allies ? Where is the sentence which reads that, had 
he been the commander, he would have " boasted of it," or have " pub- 
licly claimed" it? Where is that "large portion" which contains the 
attempt to prove that " General Putnam had no right to command Col. 



* Mr Swett, on the publication of the Siege of Boston, favored me with the follow- 
ing note, which, in another note written subsequently tothe publication of his pamphlet, 
he informeil me was intended for publication. Under the present circumstances I hope 
to be excused lor printing it : — 
"Richard Frothingham, Jr., Esq.,— 

My dear Sir: For your history of the Siege of Boston I am very much obliged to you. 
Without time to have read it critically, I find it a remarkable monument of diligent and 
successful research, candor, impartiality and judgment. It is a very valuable addition to 
history. The subject of Bunker Hill battle 1 thought I had exhausted thirty years ago, 
but your additional information is interesting and important. We differ on one point 
only I believe worth mentioning, and that important only as a matter of curiosity, the cona- 
Di&nder in the battle, which we may discuss hereafter. 

With iriendly regard and respect, S. Swbtt." 



8 THE COMMAND IN THE 

Prescott r" These allusions, and they might be increased, are to instance* 
where the meaning has been misstated. Mr Swett does not quote the 
language he comments on, and I prefer to be judged by what is written 
rather than by what he says is written. Besides all this, and considerable 
attempts at ridicule, Mr Swett makes the serious allegations that I have 
been "grossly regardless of known facts," and have even "manufactured" 
history ! Though age, among its privileges, cannot claim exemption from 
rebuke for such injustice, yet I deeply regret the occasion which requires 
controvers)' with one, relative to whom I had felt onlj' respect, exchanged 
only courtesies, and written only commendation. 

Before going to the question of command, it may be well to examine 
some of the errors which Mr Swett alleges the History oi' the Siege op 
Boston contains. 

1. On page IGG it is related that " when General Warren entered the 
redoubt Colonel Prescott tendered him the command ; but Warren replied 
that he had not received his commission, and should serve as a volun- 
teer." Mr Swett remarks on this as " Frothingham's mistake in sup- 
posing that Warren told Prescott, as a reason for not assuming the com- 
mand, that he had not received his commission. This is a mistake of fact 
and law ; Warren, according to General Heath, said not one word about 
his commission, and his want of one did not diminish his rights of office — 
a point that has been settled by the Supreme Court of the United States," 
p. 7. Mr Swett does not quote my language, and the reader cannot find 
any such "mistake of laio" as he comments on in the Siege of Boston. 
This "point," therefore, need not be discussed. Now for the mistake 
of /act. Mr Swett had before him, when preparing his pamphlet, Presi- 
dent Sparks's MS. copy of Judge Prescott's memoir of the battle, and knew 
this was my authority for the anecdote. But what does he mean > 
Who would expect, after such a charge, to find on page 32 of Mr Swell's 
own history, the following account of what took place when Warren 
entered the redoubt: — "Prescott offered him the command; but he had 
not yet received his commission, and tendered his services to the colonel as a 
Tolunteer !" And Mr Swett says that he got this conversation from 
Colonel Putnam and Dr Jeffries. After three editions of his history has 
he concluded that he mistook those gentlemen ? Does he mean to ignore 
his own authorities ? If so, the fact must not be given up, for Judge 
Prescott states it as from his father, and it harmonizes with the recOrds 
relative to Dr Warren's appointment, as will be seen in another place. 
Is this the way my narrative is to be pronounced incorrect and then 
ridiculed ? As Mr Swett makes himself merry at what he calls my mis- 
takes, he remarks — "He sometimes, like St. Patrick, carries his head under 
his arm instead of wearing it on his shoulders." p. 13. We know it is 



BATTLE OF BUXKER HILL. V 

said that S(. Denis carried his head in his hands, and that the Anthropo- 
phagi had heads, 

" grr>w beneath their shoulders," 

but it would seem that St. Patrick's bead must have been right when 
he did his great work for Ireland. Letting this pass — how was Mr Swett's 
head located when it worked out this double "mistake of fact and law?" 

2. Mr Swett accuses me of charging Colonel Sargent " with disobeying 
Gen. Putnam's order for him to go on to Bunker Hill. This injustice to 
the reputations of Putnam and Sargent arises from the most inconceivable 
misconstruction of Col. Sargenl's letter to us," &c. &c., p. 11. And after 
considerable indignant comment — nearly two pages of it ! — Mr Swett 
returns to the charge, and says: "These arc all the facts the author has 
for the assertion, that Sargent disobeyed Putnam's order to go on to Bun- 
ker Hill," p. 12. .Now ichere is such an " assertion" made in the Siege of 
Boston ? The vfiz.(\.er cannot fnd it ! Mr Swett refers to a note at page 168, 
but without quoting it. This note occurs where, in the text, an attempt 
is made to give a definite idea of Gen. Putnam's service throughout the 
whole affair, from the laying out of the works on Breed's Hill, to his 
retreat to Prospect Hill. One sentence reads — " Some of the officers not 
under his immediate command respected his authority, while others 
refused to obey him." It is to sustain this remark that reference is made 
to the following note : — " Captain Trevett, (Mass.) for instance, applied to 
Gen. Putnam for orders ; while Colonel Sargent, (N. Hampshire) in a 
letter, MS., dated Dec. 20, 1825, writes that Putnam ' sent an officer to 
order me on to the hill, but finding I did not attend to his order he sent a 
second, who I took no notice of, A third came open-mouthed, saying,' " 
&c. This is the note referred to, and this is all that is stated about Colonel 
Sargent. Now who but Mr Swett names Bunker Hill ? And tohat charge 
is made here ? Let the reader look at p. 92 of the Siege of Boston, and 
say whether there was any disposition to do injustice to this brave officer. 
No such charge was ever thought of, much less made. It is one of Mr 
Swett's inferences. His indignation is gratuitous. 

But the "injustice" I have been guilty of, Mr Swett says "arises from 
the most inconceivable misconstruction" on my part of Colonel Sargent's 
Letter. Now to show fully the height of this " injustice" and the depth 
of this stupidity, it may be well to let Colonel Sargent speak for himself. 
He was applied to by Mr Swett for information about the battle ; and, in a 
letter dated Dec. 20, 1825, gives his story. Mr Swett, in this pamphlet, 
(Appendix,) quotes from the conclusion of this letter, but does not quote 
from the commencement of it, — doubtless relishing its details about fight- 
ing among the islands in Boston harbor far better than its details about 
Putnam and Prescott, and the Bunker Hill battle. It is proper now that 



10 THE COMMAND IN THE 

the latter should be printed. I put a few words in italics. Colonel Sargent 
writes — 

" Had General "Ward marched the whole of his troops then in Cambridge 
to Charlestown not one of the enemy would have escaped, but instead of 
that he only walked Hastings's front yard the whole day. He ordered 
Stark and Reed from Medford, and those two regiments did all that waa 
done that day, of any conscciuence, although the fatigue party stood their 
ground better than could be expected after a hard night's labor, hi nuj 
opinion, Col. Prescott is entitled to the honor of having the eommand in his 
calico gown. / doubt much if General Putnam was on the ground of battle 
for the ichole day, and that he had no regiment that I ever heard of. I 
made application three times that day to be permitted to march my regi- 
ment to Charlestown, but General Ward feared my post would be attacked, 
and for once judged right, for a large schooner, with from five to sis 
hundred men, attempted to gain the landing, but the wind against her and 
the tide turning, she returned. About 4, P. M., General Ward permitted 
me to march ray regiment with one called his own to Charlestown, but too 
late to do any good. Ge7i. Putnam, then on Prospect Hill, setU. an officer to 
order me on to the hill, but finding I did 7iot attend to his order, he sent a 
second, who I took no notice of. A third came open mouth, saying Gen. Putnam 
says the devil of hell is in you all, you icill be all cut to pieces. The words were 
scarcely uttered when I was left with Lieut. Col. Ward and my waiter. I 
had before this received a scratch from a four pound shot — the same shot 
took off Lt. Col. Ward's catouch box, and knocked down a subaltern 
behind him. I returned to head quarters." 

This, Mr Swett confesses, is the only document relating to Colonel 
Sargent. Now with this as authority, what right has Mr Swett, as he does 
in his history, to put Col. Sargent under the immediate command of Gen. 
Putnam? What right has he to say, as he docs in his pamphlet, that 
"Sargent found Putnam" on the top of Prospect Hill ? As I read this 
authority, Putnam sent successively three officers to Ssrgent with an order 
which Sargent "refused to obey," but instead of joining Putnam, on 
Prospect Hill, he went to head quarters. It was a case where a Nete 
Hampshire officer declined to acknowledge the superior authority of a 
Connecticut officer ; Sargent applied directly to General Ward for orders, 
but would not respect the orders of Putnam. The last point is the fact 
stated in the Siege of Boston. So much for the "injustice done to the 
reputations" of these two officers ! So much for my "most inconceivable 
misconstruction of Col. Sargent's letter ! !" 

But there is more to be said about Prospect UM, and hero it is necessary 
to carry a bit of war into Africa. Mr Swett in his history (Notes p. 4) 
quotes frora a letter by Rev. Joseph Thaxttr, in which this hill is 



Battle of bunker hill. 11 

mentioned, though in the quotation it appears as "one of the neiffhbormg 
hills".'.' This letter was dated "Edgarton, June 15, 1818," and was 
addressed to Messrs Monroe & Francis. It will do no harm to print, for the 
first time, the whole extract. It reads — 

" The writer yesterday saw Thos. Cooke, Esq. In 1775 he was a member 
of the Provincial Congress, and one of the signers of the sword in hand 
money. He was on the day of the Bunker Hill fight at Cambridge- 
He went down to Prospect Hill and saw the whole transaction of the 
day. He says that all was confusion, there was no command. That he 
saw Gen. Putnam, who did all that man could do to get on the men to 
Breed's Hill ; that he appeared firm and resolute, thoughtless of personal 
danger, and that his praise was in the mouth of every one ; that at that 
time nor ever after did he ever hear any one speak a disreputable word 
against him." 

Mr Swett, in his history, besides suppressing the 7iame of the hill, sup- 
pressed also the significant remark, " all was confusion, there teas no 
command." And he suppresses also Mr Thaxter's own opinion in the same 
letter, viz: — "As to military discipline and command there was none." 
Neither suited his purpose ! To fit his theory exactly this letter of 
Thaxter's must be garbled ! 

On these two letters of Sargent and Thaxter, I remark, 1. They serve 
to show the character of this sort of authority, and how cautiously it must 
be used. 2. Here two manuscripts, so long unpublished, harmonize on 
one point. Sargent (1825) says that about 4 P. M. Putnam was on 
Prospect Hill : Thaxter's letter (1818) says that Thomas Cooke went on 
to Prospect Hill and saw Putnam, who did all man could do to induce men 
to go to Breed's Hill. Now Stiles (June 23, 1775) states that towards 
night Putnam went away from the action " to fetch across reinforcements, 
and before he could return our men began to retreat." 3. Sargent says 
Prescott was the commander, while Thaxter and Cooke say there was no 
command. 

3. Here as well as any where, another charge of Mr Swett may be 
noticed, because it serves to show how far partisan feeling has carried him. 
He has nearly a page of disparaging remark on the history, because the 
name of this same Kev. Joseph Thaxter is not mentioned in it, and espe- 
cially in connection with the celebration of the fiftieth Jubilee (1825) of 
the battle, when he made the prayer. Mr Swett, after remarking that he 
"looked in vain to find his name," says (p. 27) that, "The author has 
devoted twenty-two pages to this jubilee and monument, without one 
syllable to spare for the patriotism, eloquence, and unction of this most 
interesting relic of olden time, or for the mention of any religious service 
whatsoever on the occasion;" and again he remarks that, though I "dwell 



12 



THE COMMAND I.N' TUK 



on AVebster's eloquent address," yet there is "not the slightest notice" ol 
any prayer ; and fnalli/, his pious indignation culminates in assorting that, 
•'The neglect of all religious services on the occasion w. 11 be considered 
by all those who give credit to the author's history as a serious imputation 
on our national character" ! ! Well, our national character certein/y ought 
to be looked after. But 1. As to the twenty-two pages of matter. The 
reader will find in them accounts of the early celebrations of the battle ; of 
the first monument on Breed's Hill ; of the origin and progress of the 
Bunker Hill Monument Association, and the only account of much length 
there is existing ; a history of the bulding of the monument ; a general 
view of the two great celebrations of 1825 and 1843, and of the Ladies' 
Fair ; the cost of the monument, and a minute description of it ! So much 
for this twenty-two pages about "this jubilee and monument !" Cannot 
Mr Swett state a thing right ? 2. "A faint outHne" only is presented of 
the great celebration of 1825 ; and of this, the whole notice in the text of 
the ceremony of laying the corner stone, and of the oration, including 
■where I "dwell on Webster's eloquent address to the sovereign people," 
and even quote his splendid words, makes ten lines ! But it is xox TKUJi 
that, in them, there "is not the slightest notice of religious services" for the 
account concludes, (p. 345)—" When the exercises here toere concluded," &c. 
One definition of "exercise" is "act of divine worship," and Mr Swett may 
look into either Webster's or Worcester's dictionary as authority ! Now 
the "Address" had been mentioned, and "exercises" after it, manifestly, do 
not refer to wheeling regiments, but imply, in addition to the address, the 
acts of divine worship that, in this Christian land, are common on such 
occasions. Even the language itself must be perverted to sustain such 
libel as Mr Swett has written ! And those who wring out of this account 
"a serious imputation of our national character, "must hate this character 
intensely, be most inveterate word-catchers, and twist language from its 
obvious import. 3. It might have been better to have stated that Ilev. 
Joseph Thaxter made the prayer, but no want of respect for the memory 
of this venerable veteran occasioned the "neglect." Better this omission, 
however, than to have been guilty of garbling and falsifying the account 
of the battle the p:uiiot left behind him. 

4. The next alleged error relates to the case of Captain Callender. Mr 
Swett lets his pen run as follows : "If any thing could be more -wonderful 
than the author's mistaking one hill for another, when both have bcon 
before his eyes from his birth, it would be his adducing this case as one 
of disobedience, or a case of any kind to disprove that Putnam was the 
commander," p. 12. This indeed would be wonder upon wonder— if it 
were only true. But that I mistook Prospect Hill for Bunker Hill is one 
fancy ; that this case of Callender is cited to disprove that Putnam wa* 



BATTLi; OF BUNK.KH UlLU. 13 

the commander, is another fancy. Where is it so "adduced ?" Really 
Mr Swett's devotion to his hero leads him into strange misapprehensions. 
The reader will look in vain for such mistakes and citations in the pages of 
the Siege of Boston. Once more I ask, what in the name of common sense 
iloes Mr Swett mean ? On page 16-i of the Siege this very caseis "adduced" 
among the things that bear in favor of Putnam, and 7io lohcre is it cited 
against his "claims !" The very report made to the provincial congress, 
\yhich Mr Swett accuses me of neglectinr;, was thoroughly studied, {and 
Mr Swett hieio it) and is fairly quoted, and in favor of Putnam ! Indeed 
this report, and the evidence given on the trial of Colonel Scammans 
were the main authorities for stating that General Putnam gave orders to 
the reinforcements. 

But the strictures on pages 12, 13, relative to Callender, were not 
enough, and so Mr Swett (p. 22) adverts to this case again, and says: — 
"But allow the gentleman, as in regard to Callender, to manufacture his 
own case, grossly regardless of all known facts," What case have I manu- 
factured ? What "known facts" have I been regardless of? The chief 
thing that appears to be specified in this case is this: — "The author's 
declaration that Callender was tried for disobedience 27th June, seems to 
be a poetic license. "Ward orders the court martial at that time, without 
the slightest intention of such a charge," p. 13. AVhy does not Mr Swett 
quote my language? But 1. He alludes here, I presume, to a remark 
(p. 185) of the Siege, when the question of cortimand is not alluded to, but 
where an account is given of Callender, and it reads — "Capt. Callender, 
for disobedience of orders and alleged coioardice was tried June 27th." And 
again I say — "Captc.in Callender despised the charge of coioardice, and 
determining to wipe out the unjust stigma," &c. INow what sort of 
"license" has Mr Swett taken with my "declaration" ? Something more 
than a poet's license, I fancy ! 2. Any one would suppose, from Mr 
Swett's words, that Ward's order for a court martial specified what the 
charge was. Here it is — June 27, "The general orders that a general court 
martial be held this day at the lines, to try Captain Callender of the train 
of artillery. Witnesses on both sides to be duly summoned to attend a 
court which is to sit at 8 o'clock A. M., Col. Little president, Capt. Mosely 
judge advocate." What light does this throw on the matter ? And what 
must be said of the character of Mr Stoett's appeal to it f 

5, Mr Swett, in denying that a portion of the troops refused to obey 
General Putnam, writes as follows : — " Now, we say with the utmost 
confidence, that, any few cases of cowardice out of the question, no military 
despot was ever obeyed with more implicit subjection than Putnam was 
throughout the battle, by every one, officers and men," — p. 10. This, 
coming from so thorough an investigator, from a thirty years' student of 



14 THE COMMANI> IN XUK 

the battle, is worth examination ; though, had it come from another, it 
niiu;ht be passed over with the simple remark, that it indicated more 
dogmatism than knowledge. Mr Swett, however, confesses that he is 
leading "a forlorn hope." 

Now General Putnam had little or nothing to do with the original 
detachment, if the two hundred Connecticut men, after they got to the rail 
fence, be excepted. There is no proof thathe gave an order to it throughout 
the whole affair, but on the contrary, this is denied in the strongest terma. 
But his principal service was rendered in connection with the reinforce- 
ments, which arrived at the scene of action in the afternoon. After the 
first attack, he rode to Bunker Hill, and to the rear of it, to urge them 
forward. But they hesitated. He used every effort, especially, it is stated, 
at Charlestown Neck and on Bunker Hill, to overcome this refuctance. 
He ordered, entreated, encouraged and threatened, but all in vain. "The 
plea was" — I quote a report made in 1775 — "the artillery was gone, and 
they stood no chance for their lives in such circumstances, declaring they 
had no officers to lead them." They could not be prevailed upon to go 
where fighting was, and so large bodies of the troops remained out of the 
action. This fact is one of the most reliable, as well as most discreditable, 
relative to the battle. In truth, the state of things on Bunker Hill and in 
the rear of it, during the afternoon, was more like positive disobedience, 
than like " implicit subjection." However it may have been at Prescott's 
post there was no such efficient command in other parts of the field as is 
expressed in Mr Swett's language, anything he has written, or may write, 
to the contrary notwithstanding. There was confusion when he leaves the 
inference that there was order. The evidence on this point is conclusive — 
overwhelming. 

Thus Captain Chester (1775) states: — "Those that came up as recruits 
were most terribly frightened, many of them, and did not march up with 
that true courage that their leader ought to have inspired them with." 
William Tudor (1775) says — "They were discouraged from advancing." 
Rev. John Martin (1775) says — "During the whole or most of the action 
Colonel Gerrish, with one thousand men was at the bottom of Bunker 
Hill and ought to have come up but did not." Contemporary authority as 
decisively connects General Putnam with the reinforcements. This is not 
denied. Thus Daniel Putnam, his son, states that he rode to the rear "to 
urge on reinforcements ;" and Stiles states that he left the field to urge 
them on. Mr Swett, in his history, has no such "implicit subjection." 
He relates (p. 35) the efforts Putnam made at Charlestown Neck to induce 
the reinforcements that reached there to pass across ; and although he 
"entreated, encoxiraged, and threatened," he could only get "some of the troops" 
"to venture over." Again, when Gerrish was on Bunker Hill with part 



BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. 15 

of his regiment, the men disorganized and dispersed, "Putnam" — it is Mr 
Swett who writes this — "ordered them on to the lines ; he entreated and threat- 
ened them, and some of the most cowardly he knocked down with his 
sword, bui all i)i vain!" Once more, p. 41, he says — "Putnam rode to tho 
rear and exhausted every art and effort to bring them on. Capt. Bailej' 
only reached the lines." The evidence as to the confusion is equally 
clear. John Pitts (177j) says — "There never was more confusion and 
less command." In Major Gridley's sentence (1775) emphatic allusion is 
made to "the great confusion that attended" the transactions. Captain 
Chester (177o) says of things on Bunker Hill near the close of the 
battle — "When we arrived there was not a company in any kind of order. V 
But why multiply testimonj' on this point? Mr Swett himself says, in his 
history, p. 50 — "Great allowance must be made for those unable, and those 
unioillinrf to go on ; the men loent on or off as they pleased and when they 
pleased !" 

Now with such evidence — and this is but a tithe of what may be 
adduced — is it not surprising that such a claim of efficient command should 
be set up at this late day, with nothing but bare assertion to support it > 
If it were so, if there were this implicit subjection, this ready obedience, 
the enemies of General Putnam might ask with force, what they have 
asked in weakness — 'Whj', if he was so obeyed, were not the troops at the 
lines ? Could he not have led them up r' To affirm that he was obeyed 
implicitly, by officers and men, and then to be obliged to admit that tliose he 
commanded were not in battle raging a stone's throw off, is to place the 
brave old general in an awkward position, a position he never filled in his 
life time. Mr Swett's zeal here lacks discretion. 

6. Another mistake seems to astonish Mr Swett "by its magnitude, nay 
its sublimity." He says — "According to him, the great battle of Bunker 
Hill was fought, on our side, by a headless mob ; and, to prove this, he 
adduces the most incontrovertible argument in the world, were it true, that 
the army at Cambridge, which had been for two months collecting and 
organizing under the able and experienced Gen. Ward, assisted by a host 
of accomplished veteran officers, was itself a mob," — p. 3. No quotation 
is made to sustain these remarks, and none can be made. Nothing to war- 
rant it can be found in the book, and it is enough to stamp it as glaring 
misrepresentation. I hold no such opinion. I adduce no such argument. 
It may be cruel to annihilate so much "magnitude" and "sublimity," but 
I must state that they have no better basis than Mr Swett's imagination. 

In opposition to this "mob" theory, Mr Swett goes to the other extreme, 
and affirms, p. 18 — " That the armj' at Cambridge was regularly organized 
and consolidated under Ward, Warren, Piitnam, and other officers in 
regular gradation, without any distinction in regard to the colonies whence 



16 THE COMMAND TN TUE 

the troops came." And this is repeated on p. 21, and again on p. 29^ 
In fact this constitutes the foundation of one of Mr Swell's "incontrovert- 
ible" proofs that Putnam was the commander. It is strange that Mr Swett 
should venture upon such assertions flatly in the face of the most positive 
evidence. He makes no attempt to disprove the facts, first brought toge- 
ther in the Siege of Boston, (pp. 93 to 101) relative to the action of the 
colonies, and which were drawn entirely from contemporary MSS. and 
authorities. It is not necessary to repeat them here. They show that 
each of the four colonies commissioned its troops, supplied them with 
provisions, directed their disposition, and that it was not until after the 
battle of Bunker Hill that the Committee of War of Connecticut ordered 
Generals Spencer and Putnam, while their troops were in Massachusetts, 
to obey General Ward as commander-in-chief, in order that there might 
be " a due subordination ;" and also advised the colonies of Khode Island 
and New Hampshire to do the same respecting their troops. That the 
army (June 17, 1775) was regularly organized and consolidated is not true- 

The evidence in relation to the want of organization in the Massachu- 
setts army is ample. This army certainly cannot be said to have been 
settled under officers in "regular gradation." I have a report made to the 
provincial congress of Massachusetts, dated June 15, 1775, by a committee 
appointed "to consider the claims and pretensions of the colonels," which 
goes with much particularity into many cases, and recommends several to 
be commissioned, which was not done, however, until after the battle. 
On the 2lst of June an important committee was raised " to inquire into 
the reason of the present want of discipline in the Massachusetts army, and 
to report to this congress what is the i^roper way to put said army into a proper 
regulation ;" and on the next day, the congress ordered the committee of 
safety to present lists of persons worthy to be commissioned, " that so our 
army may be organized as soon as possible." The army regularly organized 
and consolidated ! I beg Mr Swett will make himself acquainted with the 
facts, from authentic sources, before he writes again. 

The old soldiers gave Mr Swett, when he prepared his history, better 
information than he writes in his last pamphlet. On page 11 (edition of 
1826) he says : — " They (the troops) were strangers to discipline and almost 
to subordination. Though nominally organized into regiments, these were 
deficient in numbers, many of them only skeletons, and their respective 
ranks not ascertained. Some of the troops were yet serving as minute 
men, and the officers in a number of regiments toere not yet commissioned." 
Again, p. 14 : The Americans " were unable to appreciate the necessity 
of discipline or to understand the unoUganized state of the army in 
EVERY DEPARTMENT ! !" But in 1850 the same -writer has it that this same 
«rmy was "regularly organized and consolidated," und in " regular grada- 



BATTr.E OV BTTNKElt HILI,. IT 

fion" It really seems only necessary to adduce Mr Swett's facts to correft 
Mr Swett's imagination. 

The reminiscences of the veterans go so far in this direction as to border 
even on injustice to the army, if they do not make it a mob. Thus, Gen. 
Dearborn states that "nothing like discipline had entered into the army," 
and MrThaxter, whom Mr Swett likes as an authority, writes severely on 
this point. He says :—" As to military discipline and command (in the 
battle) there was none ; both officers and men acted as volunteers, each 
one doing that which he thought right." * *" At that time our army was 
little better than a mob, without discipline, and with little command till 
General Washington came, and Gates, and gave it some regularity," It 
•would be quite easy to increase quotations of this character. Eut this 
will answer. It conveys a very incorrect idea of the army to say that it 
was a mob, but it is as incorrect to say that it was regularly organized and 
consolidated. 

7. Mr Swett, p. 16, writes — "We are delighted to discover, at last, 
something amusing in one of the author's mistakes. He says Putnam 
had the command of i regiment, because he was complimented with the 
empty title of colonel of a particular regiment," &c. &c. And then follows 
nearly a page of matter in which "signing humble servant" in letters, "the 
king of Prussia," "the virgin Mary," "wolves heads," figure, along with 
surmises about my "hallucination," and my ideas about "the odd notion" of 
"perdition," and of "the head of the wolf Putnam slew." Here, as usual 
all through the pamphlet, if I am quoted at all, it is with gross injustice. 
But what is all this for r What is the offence / I am really at a loss to 
know what it is. On page 100, the action of Connecticut is stated, and 
that the regiments of Spencer and Putnam, and part of Parson's, were 
ordered to Cambridge. Will this be contested ? On p. 168, it is stated 
that Putnam "was in command of the Connecticut troops stationed at Cam- 
bridge," and in another place are specified, the regiments and parts of 
regiments that were here. Will this be disputed ? Again, I state, p. 168 — 
"No service was more brilliant than that of the Connecticut troops whom he 
(Putnam) loas authorized to command." Again, p. 188 — "The Connecticut 
forces at Cambridge icere under the command of General Putnam." Is there 
any thing wrong here ? What is there then so amiising? What has drawn 
forth nearly a page of sitch attempt at ridicule ? Is it that I name the 
undoubted fact from the records of the Connecticut assembly, that General 
Putnam had a regiment ? Has Mr Swett forgotten how he commences his 
own account of the battle? His first paragraph, p. 18, reads — "The same 
order issued for one hundred and twenty of Gen. Putnam's regiment, and 
Capt. Gridley's company of artillery with two field pieces;" a statement, 
by the way, nearlv all wrong : for "the same order" for Prescott's, Frve's, 



18 THE COMMAND IN THE 

and Bridge's regiments to parade (see Fenno's Ms. Orderly Book,) 1, did 
not embrace the Connecticut men ; 2, nor Gridley's company ; 3, there 
were two hundred men; and 4, they were not all taken from "Putnam's 
regiment" — four errors in less than three lines! But to return. Once 
morel ask, what is the mistake Wmve committed about Gen. Putnam's 
regiment ? What is there so amusing ? Where is the point of the ridicule r 

Mr Swett throughout his pages has much matter rather personal, which 
may pass for what it is worth. He supposes how I would write on 
"chemistry" and "astronom;/ ;" he compares me to a character Colman has 
in his " Broad Grins," and to a clergj-man "fulminating" against the 
*'jLiuntinj top-knots our foremothers wore ;" and he accuses me of mooting 
questions " on a par with that of free agency or the origin of evil" It is not, 
however, necessary even to specify other such matter. He makes Presi- 
dent Adams, Sen., and Judge Tudor, after failing " so cgregiously" on a 
certain question, jump into a "quickset hedge" and ascribes to me a power 
oifolloioing them with my "eyes shut." I feel honored in being put in such 
society, and as yet suffer no inconvenience from the place we occupy. 
But one remark I protest against. On p. 10 he says we are writing on 
a subject technical, and "concerning ■which both of us confess we know 
little or nothing." Here I claim at least the privilege of the dying. Posi- 
tively, Mr Swett has no authority to act as my confessor. And how a 
person, who, in 1818, stated that "from his attention to military subjects," he 
consented to describe the battle, and who since, has had a thirty years' 
study of it, can in 1850 " confess" that professionally, he knows «' little or 
nothing" about it, seems " most inconceivable." 

The errors that have been examined appear to be the most material 
which Mr Swett has specified, though he names others, and eren grows 
desponding over their number. He remarks, p. 10 — "We have made the 
supposition of the author's fundamental error being solitary ; but errors, 
like misfortunes, never come alone. The lost traveller who wanders from 
the right road enters a boundless field of aberration, and at every step 
plunges deeper into a chaos of mistakes." The right road in this case is 
probably the beaten path of Mr Swett's history, and every step from it is 
aberration and a plunge deeper into "chaos." The reader can judge of the 
nature of some of these mistakes. Others are of like character. It is 
however, entirely inadmissible that facts resting on contemporary documents 
are to be proved errors by the recollection of aged people. Is it not a wa>te 
of words to refute charges based on this sort of proof? I have aimed to 
give a faithful relation of facts, and on this score fear no investigation and 
ask no quarter. But more of this in another place. 

But in spite of this endeavor to state things exactly, it would be strange 
indeed if the " ISicgc of Boston" did not contain errors, for what book is 



BATTLE 0>' UUiNKEK HILL. 19 

without them ? As yet none of luuuh iinportaiiue have been pointed out, 
though I should thank any one who will inform me of such as there are 
and should be glad to correct them. Two may be here acknowledged: one 
on page 13-5 where "to a slough," should read " towards a slough." I regret 
to have met with no particular contemporary description of the intrench- 
inents, and henca quoted Mr Stcett's loords, and this error was copied from 
his Hi.story ! (This quotation is acknowledged on p. 135 of Siege of Boston 
as from p. 20 of his History.) Another error is on page 164, where 
" rldinff do^vn the hill" should read " (joiinj down the hill," an error inad- 
vertantly made in copying for the press. Long before Mr Svvett printed his 
pamphlet he kneio hoio these errors occurred, and also knew they were 
acknowledfjed and corrected for a subsequent edition of the Siege of Boston. 
What more could be done? 

When this is considered let the reader judge the spirit or purpose or 
honor that could have dictated Mr Swell's comments on these two error^^. 
1. Of the breastwork error, he says — " By describing it as reaching down 
to the slough he has represented it as longer than it was, and has marred 
and obscured by this mistake one of the principal features of the battle," 
&c., &c., p. 5. Indeed ! Is this so ? Let both descriptions be examined 
and it will be seen who, in this, has "marred and obscured" this battle the 
most. The Siege says, page 13-5 — " A breastwork beginning a short 
distance from the redoubt, and on a line with its eastern side, extended 
about one hundred yards north to a slough." The distance specified was 
taken by measure from Page's Plan — " to a slnugh" was taken from Mr 
Swett's History! The error is mostly correelcd by the limitation. Now 
Mr Swett's description (History, p. 20, 1823 edition) read.s — "A breast- 
work ran in a line with it north down to the slough," The error here has no 
corrective ! My breastwork runs only *' about one hundred yards north." 
Mr Swett's breastwork runs north down splash to the slough, — marring and 
obscuring (/ie says,) the princirval features of the memorable Bunker Hill 
battle ! But really he is altogether too severe on his mistake ! 2. On the 
other error Mr Svvett writes — " As if purposelj^ to declare he did not 
think anything relative to Putnam deserving of ordinary care or attention, 
he says — 'This report states Callender was riding down the hill, when 
there is not a syllable of the kind,' " p. 13. Now, 1st, the words put upon mo 
between quotation marks are not mine. This is not what I say. The 
statement in the Siege, p. 164, is— " In the report (1775) made to the 
Massachusetts provincial congress it is stated that on Bunker Hill ho 
(Putnam) ordered Capt. Callender, who was riding down the hill, 'to 
stop and go back.' " This statement, suljstituting ffoing for riding, is cor- 
rect. The exact statement of the report is that "an officer of the train 
was drawing his cannon down" Bunker Hill, when General Putnam met 



20 xat: command in tue 

him and ordererl him "to stop and go back." " He refused, until the 
( jcnoral threatened him with immediate death, upon which he returned 
up the hill again, but soon deserted his post. Another officer, who had 
the direction of another cannon, conducted much in the same manner." 
And in another place Captains Gridley and Callcnder are named as being 
t le officers. Now, by comparing this report with an article on Callender 
in the Centinel (1818), it will be seen that it was Callender "who loas govvj 
down the hill." The sentence in the Siege is quoted simply to show that 
Gen. Putnam gave orders in the battle, and is concise, but it was written 
with "care and ultention." I fearlessly appeal to the report to sustain this 
remark. Let Mr Swett look at it closely, calmly, and surely he cannot 
again write that "\heve is not a syllable of the kind there!" As though I 
had manufactured the whole statement ! Here, then, an inexact quotation 
from the Siege, and a false statement as to fact, are prefaced by an 
illiberal, unjust and even wanton remark. Let the Siege of Boston, 1 had 
almost written everywhere, answer whether its author " did not think any- 
thing " " deserving of ordinary care and attention" relative to General 
Putnam. While Mr Swett is dealing out such rank injustice, accusing 
me of "sacrificing" Putnam's character, of "racking my fancy" to discover 
objections against "his claims," and I know not what else, it is peculiarly 
gratifying to me to be able to show the impression which the pages of this 
volume, as far as they relate to Putnam, made on a candid critic. An article 
on the Siege of Boston, in the Philadelphia Bulletin — understood to be 
from the pen of William B. Ri;eu, Esq., the accomplished author of the 
Life of President Heed — after, I fear, too favorable a notice of my labors, 
reads : — 

" For one thing we especially thank Mr Frothingham — his defence of 
Putnam from the miserable imputations which anonymous or irresponsible 
writers of a late day have sought to cast on his memory. He does it 
thoroughly, and shows that at Bunker Hill, as on all occasions where he 
had a chance, the old man valiant did his duty well." 

What but partizan feeling could have dictated such gross and ground- 
less attacks on the integrity of the Siege of Boston as abound on nearly 
every page of Mr Swett's pamphlet ? 

Having thus shown what some of the accusations made against the 
History of the Siege of Boston amount to, I might here stop. If remarks 
on the Battle of Bunker Hill, to which I apprehended no intelligent 
inquirer would object, and a fair citation of the evidence on both sides, 
which it would have been grave neglect to have omitted, be excepted, the 
whole statement relative to the question of command is given in a few 
lines, and seemed to be such as the authorities quoted necessarily demand- 
ed. Thoy will do it injustice wlio discover in it. or fancy they discover. 



BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. ^l 

any disposition to make out an exclusive hero, or to Ibrtify an "invincible 
prepossession." The question really seems of little practical account. 
General Putnam acted throughout with that bravery that marked his 
nature, — at the rail fence and on the brow of Bunker Hill in the heat of 
the action, and in the rear of these urging on the reinforcements. Gen. 
Warren, armed with a musket, fought in the redoubt, where he remained 
throughout the action ; General Pomeroy, in the same way, kept at the 
rail fence ; Colonel Prescott commanded at the original entrenchment!^. 
How much would it add to the fame of either of these patriots, were it 
made out clear that either exercised, or was authorized to exercise, a 
general command ? How much would it increase the gratitude posterity 
owes to their memory for their gallant conduct ? With such views, even 
the zeal and positiveness, and injustice, of Mr Swett shall not make me a 
partizan. I have only gone where the evidence carried me. 

But the question of the command — a reallj' curious historical question — 
had to be met, and I endeavored to account for the incongruity of the 
statements relative to it, and to dispose of it, in a way, which, if free from 
non-committalism, should also be free from dogmatism. The candid must 
judge whether the attempt has been successful. Mr Swett is not satisfied 
with the disposition, and announces his intention as follows : — "It will be 
our duty to enter into a thorough investigation of this subject of the com- 
mand." It may be well, therefore, to follow him, and see how thorough 
has been his investigation, how sound is his reasoning, and how satisfactory 
is his conclusion. There is matter bearing on this subject in the Siege of 
Boston, never before printed, never before alluded to, consisting of extracts 
from original letters from General Ward and General Putnam ; an entire 
and most important letter from Colonel Prescott ; copious extracts from 
Judge William Prescott's memoir ; an important document from Rev. 
Peter Thatcher ; Rev. John Martin's statement ; a fine letter from Captain 
John Chester, a brave and accomplished officer, who was in the battle ; to 
say nothing of various other contemporary MS. letters and documents 
referred to and quoted. It is rather a question of fact than of argument. 
The positive language of contemporaries has, at least, as much to do with 
it, as considerations relative to military rank. Now, whoever professes to 
thoroughly investigate this subject, and does not cite these authorities 
fully and fairly, and consider them candidly, makes an unfortunate mis- 
take. How does Mr Swett deal with them ? 

Mr Swett first notices, for he cannot be said to quote them, the authorities 
that bear in favor of Colonel Prescott. He does not allege that they are 
inaccurately presented in the Siege of Boston, but complains that they are 
"left unexplained," and hence that they may "mislead" readers. Now the 
intention was to cite these authorities, relating both to Putnam and Pres- 



^i'i rVHL COMMAND IN THE 

L-ott, — Icaciuij out the soldiers' statements — as concisely as possible, and let 
them make their own impression. It was no part of my plan to stretch 
them, or shorten them, or twist them, or explain them, so as to sustain a 
favorite theory. Such work was left for others. Mr Swett has explained 
some of tKis testimony and what is the explanation ? Passing by sundry 
inferences that are unwarranted, and sundry statements relative to Prescott, 
put upon me that I never made, it will be sufficient to notice his manner of 
dealing with the two Thatchers', Ward's and Scamman's testimony. The 
admirable letter of Colonel William Prescott is not in this connection, 
noticed or named by him ! Mr Swett will find it, copied I think correctly 
from the original, on pp. 395 and 396 of the Siege of Boston ! Neither 
does he appear to have seen Kev. Peter Thatcher's important statement . 
This, also, he will find, in the same volume, pp. 385 and 386 ! I commend 
them to his attention. 

1 . Mr Swett comments on the statement of Rev. Peter Thatcher as fol- 
lows : — "The report of the committee of safety says — ' The commander of 
the party gave orders to retreat from the redoubt' ; and one of the writers 
of the report is supposed to have called Prescott 'the commander of the 
provincials.' That is, Prescott commanded the party, the provincials, who 
raised the redoubt, and those of them who fought there under him, till he 
gave them orders to retreat." But, 1, as to the character of this evidencp. 
What supposition is there about this authority r Supposed to have called 
Prescott the commander ! I print from the original a statement made by 
Rev. Peter Thatcher in his own handwriting, under his own signature, 
relative to his own account of the battle, which is the basis of all the 
accounts ; and I state that the sheet on which this statement is written 
encloses a manuscript copy of this account, with the interlineations pre- 
served, and that I found this at Worcester. Now this document — page 385 
of the Siege of Boston — is cither false, or it is true. If false, let Mr Swett 
say so ; if true, there can be no supposition. It is as much a fact that llev. 
Peter Thatcher says that Colonel Prescott was the commander, as it is 
that the battle was fought. 2. Let the authority bear as it will, even 
though it cut a theory at right angles, there is no such limitation about it 
as Mr Swett puts to it. Here it is — that part of it relating to the com- 
mand : — " The following account was written by a person who was an eye 
witness of the Battle of Bunker Ilill. Some of the circumstances the 
intervention of the hill prevented him from seeing, for he stood on the 
north side of Mystic river. What facts he did not see himself were com- 
municated from Col. Prescott (who commanded the provincials), and by 
other persons, who were personally conversant in the scenes which this 
narrative describes." Such is the authority. Where is the limitation that 
Mr Swett applies to it ? Mr Thatcher is talking about the luhole battle. 



BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. 1^8 

What right has Mr Swett to restrict his language to the party who raised 
the redoubt and fought there under him? If Prescott's ^WiiVio/i during the 
battle is confined to his post, the original entrenchments, it must be 
deduced from other circumstances and authorities, and not from Thatcher's 
words. If Prescott did not go to the rail fence, his sagacity saw the 
necessity of this new position, and his order occasioned it to be taken. 
But more of this is in the sequel. 

2. Mr Swett next comments on the letter of General Ward. So im- 
portant an authority required an exact quotationr but he introduces it as 
follows : — " Gen. Ward, in his letter to President Adams, 30ih Oct., '75, 
says that Bunker Hill battle was conducted by a Massachusetts officer,'' 
p. 6. These words are put in quotation marks. But whose language is 
it? Not Ward's, for he says, October 30, 1775, — " I think there has been 
no one action with the enemy which has not been conducted by an officer o f 
this colony, except that at Chelsea, which was conducted by Gen. Put- 
nam :" not mine, for this is an opinion on these words expressed as fol- 
lows : — " General Ward's remark is decisive that a Massachusetts officer 
conducted the battle." Who, then, is quoted ? There were no such words 
to quote. They were manufactured by Mr Swett. 

And the comment is of a piece with the coinage. Mr Swett sees the 
difficulty — with these words of Ward to take into the account — a writer 
who desires to be accurate has to meet, if he ascribes to a Connecticut 
offtcer the command of the battle, but he removes it in the following 
curious way : — " Ward was endeavoring to make out a strong case for the 
Massachusetts against the southern officers. As he knew it was physically 
impossible for Prescott to have conducted the battle — because he was on 
foot, and militarily so ; because there were generals and other officers older 
than Prescott on the field — he must have intended to designate himself 
or Warren as the conductor of the battle. Possibly he intended to claim the 
honor himself. The first syllable of the word •' conducted" has been 
altered by the pen : he began, perhaps, to write the word " commanded,'' 
but, recollecting that he could not claim the command, altered it into 
" conducted," p. 7. This twisting and syllable business will not answer. 
General Ward must be dealt w-ith in a straighter way and with more 
breadth of view. 

It adds force to this remark of General Ward, that it was written at a 
time when the circumstances of the battle of Bunker Hill were much 
talked of in the American camp. Nobody at this time (October, 1775,) 
thought of ascribing much credit to the plan of the enterprise to Charles- 
town. At this time it was no glory to have had the general command, or 
conduct, or responsibility of the Bunker Hill battle. But those who really 
fought this battle stood out then, as they do now, in envied prominence. 



21 TUE COMMAND IN THE 

An article in the Connecticut Courant, which does not say that Putnam 
commanded, had much to say in praise of the Connecticut officers, but not 
a word about such officers as Prescott, Brewer, Gardner, Parker, &c. 
"This account," General Heath writes October 23, 177<3, "was detested by 
the brave Putnam." The trials, also, had for months been going on for the 
ill behavior of officers. The battle, then, was no obsolete alfair. The 
camp was alive with talk about it. It is at such a time, that General 
AV'ard writes to John Adams, October 30, 177o — "I think there has been 
no one action with the enemy which has not been conducted by an officer 
of this colony, except that at Chelsea, which was conducted by General 
Putnam." The action at Chelsea took place in the previous May, in whicli. 
Genaral Putnam commanded, and led the men with great bravery.* Now, 
General Ward was thinking over the actions there had been with the 
enemy, and thinking also of General Putnam's agency in them. Had 
there been, as to the Bunker Hill enterprise, an express agreement between 
Ward and Putnam — had Putnam been detached as the general officer to 
exercise the command — had he conducted so important a battle — is it 
probable, is it possible, that a person of the strict integrity of General 
Ward would have written in this way only four months afterwards? 
Is not the inference from his words a necessary one, that General Putnam 
did not conduct, or command, in the battle of Bunker Hill, as he conducted 
or commanded in the battle at Chelsea, but that it was a Massachusetts 
officer who performed this duty ? It would not be inconsistent with these 
words to ascribe the conduct or command of the battle to Ward, or to 
Warren, or to Prescott — all Massachusetts officers— but it is utterly incon- 
sistent with them to ascribe it to General Putnam, a Comicctlcut officer. 
This remark has this significance or it has none. 

The way Mr Swett treats this authority deserves notice. He first garbles 
it, and then endeavors to evade its force. He tells, with due gravity, 
what General Ward began to write, but did not write and to crown all, 
tells who he probably intended to name as the commander, but somehow 
did not name. Mr Swett says that he meant to say " That Warren was the 
conductor or commander of Bunker Hill battle" ! ! Now really all this 
looks like " manufacturing a case." Is not this modest in one who pro- 
fesses to be so indignantly averse to such discreditable business ? But 
Mr Swett, on iYd'A fifth page of twisting, surely did not so faithfully reflect 
as he did on the ninth page, that, " We were dealing with hard characters. 
Ward, Warren, Putnam and Prescott," he there rousingly writes, " are 
not rag babies, that an historian may bend and distort according to his 
fancy. The whole kingdom of Great Britain could not bend one of 
them," &c. Why then docs he try to bend Ward's words to suit his 
theory, or distort them according to his fimcy : This is no way to deal 



CATTLE or BUNKER HH.L. *i5 

■with authorities. This is trifling with history. Mr Swett must take the 
language of Ward as it is, even though unaltered it consigns a theorj', 
nursed with parental care for more than a generation, to the tomb of the 
Capulets. 

3. The remark of Colonel Scammans — that "there was no general officer 
who commanded at Bunker Hill" — made too as though it were a perfectly 
well known fact, is first denied, and then characteristically explained so 
as to mean nothing. "The author," Mr Swett says, "attributes to Colonel 
Scammans an anonymous note in a newspaper, written perhaps by the 
editor." Now if the note were written by the editor, it was not anony- 
mous ! But let this absurdity pass. Let any one turn to the New 
England Chronicle of February 29, 1776, read there a letter requesting 
the editor "to print the proceedings of the court martial, tcith some remarks 
upon the depositions then taken," and signed "James Scammans," Colonel 
Scammans, and then say how cool it is in IMr Swett to write that "the 
note was anonymous" or that it was "written by the editor." The remark, 
I rejjeat, was undoubtedly made by Colonel Scammans, and it is so plain 
that it speaks for itself. Besides this, Mr Sv/ett charges me with omitting 
to mention here, that "Scammans, during the baitle, sent to General 
Putnam, at Bunker Hill, to see if he was wanted," and that afterward 
"General Putnam came up and ordered the regiment to advance." Now 
truly this is not omitted, but it all appears on page 164 of the Siege of 
Boston among the things bearing in favor of General Putnam! Mr Swett 
however plies his ridicule here : but really I do not see the cause of it, 
without he designed it to rebuke mo for the presumption of putting corn 
into his hopper. Up stream or down stream it seems to be all the same. 
Mr Swett's zeal for his hero has even a lover's jealously. He frankly 
admits (p. 4,) that I treat General Putnam's character "with the utmost 
candor and kindness," but still to his mind, there is a heathenish heart 
in it, — for he says, it is done, "as anirnals destined for the altar are pam- 
pered, to be sacrificed at last." The renowned Mr Burchell would say 
fudge. 

4. Mr Swett's remark on Dr J. Thatcher's statement, — a surgeon in the 
army — the first, I think, to make such a statement, is still worse. He 
says Thatcher is unequivocal in favor of Putnam's command, by placing 
him at the head of all the officers in the following words : "Generals 
Putnam, Warren, Pomeroy, and Colonel Prescott were emphatically the 
heroes of the day." And Mr Swett writes this, too, when Dr Thatcher 
goes on to say that "though several general officers were jiresent. Colonel 
Frescott retained the command during the action'!! Comment on this ia 
unnecessary. 

It is not very surprising that Mr Swett, after such a sham review of 

4 



26 THE COMMAND IN THE 

tho authoritios braiing in favor of Colonel Prescott, should venture to 
write that " in the w hole of thein there is not a shadow of an excuse" for 
my conclusion, one half of which he actually quotes, but the other half he 
characteristically suppresses ! Is it then possible that such authorities, 
the whole of them, do not supjily even "a shadoic of an excuse" for stating 
that " the original dctatchment was placed under the orders of Colonel 
Prescott, and that no general officer was authorized to command over him 
during the battle :" What ! When, according to General Ward, a 
Massachusetts officer must have conducted the battle ; when, according 
to JudgeTudor, there was no aufkorisrd general ojficer on the field ; when 
Col. Scammans says no general otficcr commanded ; -when Martin, Gordon, 
Thatcher, and Prescott himself state explicitly that the orignal detachment 
was put under Col. Prescott' s orders; when James Thatcher states that, 
though several general officers were present, Prescott retained the com- 
mand during the action ; when Peter Thatcher states that he commanded ; 
when John Pitts states that no one but Prescott appeared to have any 
command; and when Judge Prescott states that he had orders in writing, 
and that no officer exercised or claimed any authority over him during the 
battle ! When a writer confesses that evidences of this sort "come like 
shadows, so depart," all that need be said is, that the difficultj" is not with 
them, it is not that they lack character, directness, or substance, but it is 
in the writer's mind, it is what metaphysicians term subjective — perhaps it 
is a "prcponsrKs/mz" that is ^'invincible" — and it therefore cannot be reached 
and removed. 

In direct conflict with this conclusion, however, is the statement made 
first by Rev. Mr W'hitney in 17f)0, as from conversations with General 
Putnam — "That the deiachment was put under the command of General 
Putnam ; with it he tiok poi^session of the hill, and ordered the battle 
from beginning to end ;" or as Hon. John Lowell (1818) states it : — "If 
General Putnam is to be believed, he first proposed the taking possession 
of Bunker Hill, and was detached for the i^urpose of fortifying it, and Col. 
Prescott was placed under his orders ;" or as Mr Swett (1818) states it — 
^'General Putnam having the general superintendence of the expeditiom," 
accompanied the detachment; or (in 18<j0) he went to Breed's Plill, p. 23, 
•'under the express agreement with General Ward that he was to do so, 
and to have the direction and superintendence of the whole expedition." 
The proof to sustain this consists, 1. Notices in diaries, letters, or news- 
papers, giving the earliest rumors of the action, as Stiles' Boyle's, S. 
Ward's, Jackson's, Clarke. None of these are dated later than June 1775. 
Or, 2. Matter commencing with Whitney's declaration. May, 1790, and 
supported in 1818, and afterwards, by the statements of the soldiers and 
others ; as, Putnam, Groavenor, Dexter, Bancroft, Clcaveland, Allen, 



BATTLE Of BUNKEH HlLl,. 87 

Trevett, Dearborn, Thaxter, Keyes, Smith, and Low. Tlie character of 
this sort of evidence has been sufficiently dwelt upon. It is granted that a 
specious argument may be framed out of it, either in favor of Prescott or of 
Putnam, and still a more specious one, I am sure, in favor of the position 
that there was no command in the action. A re-reading of this matter 
has only served to strengthen a conviction of its unsatisfactory nature, and 
that contemporary testimony, of a proper character, ought to determine the 
question. As to proof of this sort, it will only be remarked, that I have 
not met with a single statement, in manuscript or in print, to the effect that 
General Putnam commanded in the battle of Bunker Hill, between the 
dates of June, 1775 and May, 1790. Mr Swett does not produce any such 
statement. On the contrary, every contemporary allusion to his conduct 
in the battle, I could iind, has been faithfully quoted. But the same al- 
lusions to Colonel Prescott, which also might be supported by soldiers' 
statements, are of the most, positive character, and they state that the 
orders to occupy Bunker Hill were given to him, and that no general 
officer interfered with his command. In accounting for this conflict of 
testimony, in page 166 of the Siege of Boston, I remark — "Without in- 
tending to question the honor or the veracity of any one, it is more 
reasonable to conclude that the facts communicated by the general 
(Putnam) have not been stated exactly, and with the proper discrimina- 
tions, than it is to conclude that so many independent contemporary 
authorities are incorrect in stating that the first detachment was placed 
under the orders of Colonel Prescott." 

Mr Swett has over a page of comment, as unjust to me as usual, on the 
extracts I make from Stiles' MS. Diary. President Stiles resided in 
Newport, and was in the habit of writing in his journal, very minutely, of 
the occurrences of the day ; and in long enirics, under the dates of June 
IS, 19, 20, 23, and 30, he writes of the all engrossing subject of this battle, 
as he could gather facts from letters, or from persons from the camp. The 
extracts before me are of much length, and they furnish an excellent and 
curious specimen of the rumors that went abroad relative to this battle, 
and show how cautiously this material must be used. Prom all this I 
selected two extracts, one to the effect that Gen. Putnam with 300 men 
took possession of Bunker Hill; another, that detailed _/>o«j his own lips 
his course in the action. Mr Swett does not quote these extracts, nor others 
fully. Why does he not do it ? I here give a specimen. Stiles, June 
18, journalizes : "A gentleman" from camp " this morning" "informs" 
among other things " that Col. Putnam is encamped in Charlestown, 
on Bunker Hill, and has lost one of his best cairtains, but is determined 
to stand his ground, having men enough," &c., &c. June 19. "Every 
one filled with the greatest solicitude." * * * "Charlestown is 



28 



THK COMMAND IN TUE 



in ashes." * * "We have various accounts — some that Gen. Put- 
nam is surrounded by the king's troops — some that he repulsed them," 
&c. June 20. William Ellery comes in and shows copies of several 
letters from camp, one from General Greene, "dated Lord's day evening, 
(June 18) giving an account of the battle." "General Greene says Gen- 
eral Putnam with 300 men took possession and entrenched on Bunker Hill 
on Friday night the IGth inst." I said (p. 1G4) this "vvas a rumor from 
camp, and say so again. "Why does not ilr Svvctt quote the whole of it ? 
Why leave out the 300 men ? Various other rumors, and also opinions of 
Greene's, are given. To return to Stiles. He writes : "Upon news of the 
action or landing the congress instantly broke up and those who had arms 
repaired to the tield of action. Hence Dr Warren's being in the action," 
&c. Why does not Mr Swett quote ? "Sterling gold," he says, "stamped 
at the highest mint in America !" But to go on with Stiles. The next 
entry I haA'e is dated June 23, and here we Jirst come to authentic history. 
It is General Putnam's own account, and it is so curious, that it ought to be in 
print. I quote here, therefore, all I have of this entry, which is from 
Bancroft's copy : — 

"June 23, 1775. Messrs Ellery, Chang, &c., returned here from a 
visit to the camp which they left on Saturday last. They spent an hour 
with General Putnam in his tent on Prospect Hill, about half way between 
Cambridge and Charlestown. The general gave them an account of the 
battle last Saturday, said the number on one side was not ascertained, but 
the nearest account was, that we had about fifty (not sixty) killed, and 
about twenty wounded. We lost few till the retreat. We repulsed the 
regulars three times, fought four hours. The small arms and six field 
pieces made great havoc among the regulars till our powder failed. 
General Putnam said by accounts from within Boston, the regulars con- 
fessed their loss of killed, wounded, and missing, was about one thou- 
sand. Our body on Bunker Hill, where was the action, was about loOO 
first and 700 afterwards. Putnam says he judged the regulars were 
3000. There was a reinforcement within perhaps half a mile and ought 
to have come up to their assistance, but they must pass an open cause- 
way, where the regulars kept up a heavy fire from floating batteries. 
Putnam teas not at Bunker Hill at the beginning, but soon repaired thither, 
and was in the heat of the action till totcards night, when he went aioay to 
fetch across this reinforcement which ought to have come before. Soon after, 
and before he could return, our men began to retreat ; for some impru- 
dently calling out the powder is gone, the regulars heard it, and rallied 
again, and came on with fury, and forced the trenches, and then our 
people retreated leaving the heroic General Warren mortallj' wounded 
in the trenches. * * » The army are in high spirits. They consider this 



BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. '29 

scarcely a repulse, considering the damage they did to the enemy ; and 
indeed, if, with the loss of 50 or GO killed, our people killed and dam- 
aged the regulars more than a thousand, it is a wonderful Providence. 
The troops landed under fire of the shipping, then set fire to Charlestown 
in which were oOO houses, all which, but 2 or 3, were reduced to ashes 
and ruins. Th'n about 1 or 2 o'clock P. M. they marched for the attack, 
and continued it four hours till near night." 

Now it seems almost incredible that Mr Swett should have made the 
hard remarks upon me ho has, pp. 14, 15, for selecting, of this entry, 
the paragraph la italics relative to General Putnam's personal service in 
the battle ; and even ascribe to me a motive for quoting it that I did. 
not dream of! One more extract from Stiles must suffice. "In June oO, 
Rev. Mr Martin 'visited me and gave me an account of the battle of 
Charlestown." " Mr Martin was in the whole affair from first to last." 
" He says that about 1500 went on Friday night and took possession of 
Bunker Hill, under the command of Colonel Prescott." And this is the first 
mention of Prescott's name there is in such extracts of this journal as I 
have. Then follows several pages of details, some of which are inter- 
woven in the narrative in the Siege of Boston. All I have to add is, that 
those who rely on such rumors from the camp as Stiles' first chronicles, 
— which hoAvever 'nave their value as the life-like talk of the day — will 
be liable to frame just such an account of this battle as Humphries 
in his life of Putnam has, where (in the beginning) the original detach- 
ment is put under Warren, and in the end, the British pursues to 
Winter Hill, Putnam there makes a stand, and drives them back under 
cover of their ships I 

In connection with this testimony in favor of General Putnam, Mr 
Swett finds what he calls " the most astonishing inadvertence of the 
author, though (bless the charitable admission) mere inadvertance we be- 
lieve," p. 25. It consists in "never hinting" that in llivington's New 
York Gazette, June 29, 1775, it is stated that 'Putnam on the evening 
of June IG, took possession of Bunker Hill, and began an entrenchment,' 
and this extract from Kivington was mentioned in a publication of ours, 
which he had among our documents," p. 25. I am not indebted to Mr 
Swett for a single contemporary document ; and. as for llivington's 
paper, I examined the fine file of it in the rooms of the New York Histor- 
ical Society, and made the extract, but found the same sentence in 
other newspapers, for they copied from each other. What an "aston- 
ishing inadvertence" it was in "never hintinr/" this, the reader may 
easily see by looking at page 124 of the Siege of Boston, for there the 
fact of such a statement being in the papers is given to show that Putnam 
was on the hill at night; and once more at page 164, where it is a second 



30 THK COMMAND IN THE 

tinw named anionfj the facts bearing in his favor, in the evidence on the 
question of command ! Is Mr Swett's remark, however, " mvre inadver- 
tence?" 

The only new piece of evidence adduced is an extract from John Boyle's 
manuscript annals. Mr Swett says. He "writes in his diary. Kith of June, 
I77t5, (ieneral Putnam, with a detachment of about a thousand Ameri- 
can forces, went from Cambridge and began an entrenchment on an emi- 
nence below Bunker Hill." This MS., Avhich I did not hear of until after 
the publication of the Siege of Boston, is not a diary written at the time. 
Certainly, Mr Swett must, at least, have known that the record about 
Bunker Hill battle could not possibly have been put there on the day it 
was dated, for it contains Gage's official account of the killed and 
■wounded, and the American account from the Providence Gazette, 
which did not appear till months afterwards, and could not have been then 
known ! And it requires but a moderate acquaintance with the newspa- 
pers of this period to see, at a glance, that this interesting MS. is a com- 
pilation mostly from them, and often, as in this case, in their language. 
Yet Mr Swett quotes this in a diary written at the time ! The fact stated 
by Boyle is taken from the newspapers, and is given on p. 164 of the 
Siege ! 

To supply the i^lace of this diary, thus struck away, I cheerfully quote 
a real diary, which I did not see until the Siege was in type, and which 
will answer Mr Swett's purpose as well as Boyle's, if not better. It is 
the account of Samuel Bixby, at the time of the battle a soldier at Rox- 
bury. It begins : — "June 17, Saturday, Colonel Putnam, with a large 
party, went on to a hill in Charlestown, called Bunker Hill, last nieht to 
entrench" — and all through the relation, no officer is even named but 
"Colonel Putnam." The simple explanation of the whole of these early 
rumors, or reports, is, that from General Putnam's being so active during 
the day of the battle, the report went abroad, that the entrenching party 
went on under him; when the fact was that it went on under the 
orders of Colonel Prescott. 

Mr Swett's statements about Putnam, AVarrcn, Pre^!cott, and the ques- 
tion of command, when brought together, make a singular medley. 

1. He represents (p. 22,) that Putnam at last persuaded "the prudent 
Ward" "to grant him a detachment" "to meet the enemy ;" and went 
to Breed's Hill under " an express agreement" that he was "to have the 
direction and superintendence of the whole expedition" (p. 23,) : and he 
proves that Putnam was the commander by the nature of the army, by his 
rank, and a third and fourth time, by his conduct in the battle, during 
which "there Avas scarcely a regiment, corps, or individual of the army 
that Putnam did not personally command, direct, or encourage" {\t. 28,1 : 



BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. 31 

for "ho was galloping from end to end of the line, encouraging, directing, 
commanding every body." In fact "no military despot was ever obeyed 
with more implicit subjection." He was "the bright particular star, to 
which, during all the storm and tempest of the battle every eye wa? 
turned for guidance and for victory," p. 29. This is exclusive enough, 
dogmatic enough, and general enough, to satisfy any body. Here Gen- 
eral Putnam, if words mean anything, is from first to last, and by special 
agreement, the authorized, sole general commander. 

2. Mr Swett, however, states (p. 7,) that Gen. Warren "was on the 
field, vested with all the rights and authority of a major general;" 
and (p. 29,) "notwithstanding he declined to issue any orders, was au- 
thorized to do so whenever he pleased," and "thus was the authorized, 
and for many years the supposed commander." Knowing this. Ward, 
(p. 7,) "probably intended to say that he was the conductor or command- 
er" in his letter. But (p. 29,) General Putnam was the actual, and on 
Warren's declining, the authorized commander." Ward was (p. 7,) "doubt- 
less ignorant of the fact that Warren refused to exercise any command 
on the occasion" ! ! But what becomes of the "express agreement" 
between Ward and Putnam? Was this contingency of Warren's de- 
clination in it ? AVas Putnam to have the whole direction only in case 
Warren did not choose to assume it ? Is it for a moment admissible that 
General Ward did not know when he wrote his letter, who was detached 
to the command, who exercised it, or who conducted the battle ? Is it 
not a direct attack on Ward's reputation to impute to him such disgrace- 
ful ignorance ? 

3. Mr Swett states (p. 30,) " Colonel Prescott was commander at 
Bunker (Breed's) Hill the night before the battle, and the next day till 

Gen. Putnam came on with the reinforcements ; and during the battle, 
the commander at the redoubt." What is the authority for such a state- 
ment ? If Dr Whitney, Mr Lowell, and Mr Daniel Putnam are exact in 
giving General Putnam's conversation, he stated that the original detach- 
ment was placed under his command, and that Colonel Prescott acted 
under his orders. This indeed must have been so, if General Putnam, 
according to Mr Swett, by express agreement, had the superintendence 
of the whole expedition. How then could Prescott have been the com- 
mander the night before the battle and up to noon the next day ? If Put- 
nam and Prescott had differed any time previous to noon on the I7th, 
then, according to this last theory, the responsibility of decision rested 
on Prescott. Was this in the agreement ? Did a general agree to be 
commanled by a colonel ? There could have been no such incongruitj\ 

4. Mr Swett viewing General Ward as, in one sense, the commander, 
comes to the conclusion, (p. 30,) that, "There were then four who in 
<;nine sense pnrtli-ipatrd in the command of Bunker Hill battle" — not the 



iV2 THE COMMAND IN THE 

exact trutli, but nearer to it than anj' theory of the pamphlet. And he 
says, "It may be impossible to demonstrate who was exclusively the com- 
mander as to discover the author of Junius or the birth place of Homer." 
Ettti Brute! And after so much "incontrovertible," "perfectly decisive 
proof," "express agreement," despotic command, and "implicit subjec- 
tion" relative to Putnam: After charging me with treating his character 
with candor only to sacrifice it at last — with robbing him of the com- 
mand and not enriching any one ? Who is doing sacrifice here? Who 
is committing robbery here? Who is enriching any one here? However, 
Mr Swett is correct if ho means that it is impossible, from the known 
evidence, to demonstrate who was exclusively the commander, for it 
all tends to show that there was on the field no general officer who exercised 
a general command. Such at least is the view that will be found to be 
taken in the Siege of Boston ! 

5. Mr Swett (p. 10,) says : "All the world knows that he (Putnam) 
did come forward and exercise the command most effectually from the 
beginning to the end of the engagement :" on p. 29, Mr Swett says : 
"Seventy- five years ago the battle of Bunker Hill was fought. Who the 
commander was has ever since remained a mystery." Now these two 
things cannot be. What "all the world knows" certainly cannot be a 
"mystery," i. e. a profound secret, (see Webster) on something wholly 
unknown. If Mr Swett clings to the mystery ho must give up the 
knowledge. 

Such are the conclusions on the subject of command in the Bunker 
Hill battle, of "an author in spite of himself," who "thirty-two years 
ago consented to write an account" of it, and who this year considered it 
his "duty to enter into a thorough investigation" of this question. History 
cannot be worth much that resolves itself into such a mass of absurdity 
and contradiction. 

But there is something more serious than inconsistency to allege against 
Mr Swett's conclusions. What is the authority for the following, I think, 
neio statement? — "Maj. Gen. Ward was the commander in chief of the 
army at Cambridge ; Maj. Gen. Warren, the next; Brig. Gen. Putnam 
the third in command ; and Col. Pre&cott, another officer of the army," p. 
29. This is neither correct, first, as to the general army, even if it werf? 
"consolidated ;" for General Thomas was the second in command; General 
Whitcomb ranked above General Warren ; General Pomeroy probably 
(for he was an older officer) ranked above General Spencer, and Sfencer 
certainly ranked Putnam. It is difficult to say who would have ranked 
as between Brigadier General Putnam and Brigadier General Greene. 
Nor second, as to that portion of the army stationed immediately at Cam- 
bridge, for Major General Whitcomb ranked above Major General Warren, 
and Cicneral Pomerov ranked above General Putnam. Nor was Goneral 



WATTLV. OF lUJNKER HILL. 



33 



"Ward, in either case, at the date of the ba'tle, the regular commander-in- 
chief, excepting of the ^Massachusetts forces. But more about these 
officers in another place. The onh* strictly accurate thing in the statement 
is, that Col. Prescott was another officer of the army ! Mr Swett's facts 
being taken from him his theory falls. 

I have done with Jlr Swett's pamphlet. A remark relative to his History 
needs justification. 

It has been stated that the narrative of the organization of the army 
and of the battle of Bunker Hill in the Siege of Boston, differs materially 
in details from the account of the same events in Mr Swett's History. As 
an instance of this, as to the former, take the two statements of the 
action of E,hode Island, — selected because they are the shortest : — 

Frnm the Siege of Boston. From Mr Sireti^s History. 

" The Rhode Island afseinhiy, April £5, " Rhode Island had sent o reaiment to 
voted to raii=e fifteen hunt'red ineii, to con- Iw'Lippachusetts imbued with the determined 
slitnte 'an army of obi'ervation,' and or- spirit ol civil and religious liberty, which 
dered it to 'join ?.nd cooperate vs ith the the founder of tlieir state maintained through 
forces (f the neighboring colon'es.' This every peril. Co/mic? Greene was tlieir corn- 
force was orjjanized into three rcffiment.-i, of niander, one ot the most prominent lieroes of 
eight companies each, under Colonels Var- the revolution. The elements of a soldier 
iium, Hilchcock, and Church, and placed were so mixed in him, that his elevated rank 
under tlie command of A''atkaniel Greene, among distinguished warriors was already 
with the rank of brigadier-generat. One of anficipated. Under him wore Lieut Col. 
the companies was a traiii "of artillery, and Ohiey, and Maj. Sox, an exiierienced Eng- 
had the colony's field pieces. General lish soldier. An arlillery company with 
Greene, on arriving at the camp, Jamaica four field pieces was attached to the corps." 
Plains, found his command in great disor- 
der: and it was only by his judicious labors, 
and great personal influence, that it was 
kept together. In the rules and regulations 
t.ir the government of this force, it is called 
' The Rhode Island army.' They provide 
that 'all public stores, taken in the enemy's 
ramp or magazines,' should be 'secured for 
ihe nss of the colony of Riiode l»la!ia.' 
It was not until June 28 that this colony 
passed an act putting iis troops under ihe 
orders of the general of the combined army." 

And the variations, as to the details of the action of the other three 
colonics, are still greater. 

The same thing ■will be found to prevail as to the battle. Take, as an 
illustration, the two first paragraphs of the two accounts. 

From the Siege of Boston. From Mr Swett\^ History. 
" On Friday, the sixteenth of June, the " On the 16th of June, 75, the sun fell 
commanders of the army, in accordance with its full force on the American camp, 
with the recommendation'cf the committee the earth wns parched up, but the vigorous 
of safety, took measures to fortify Bunker frames and patri( tic spirit of the s<ildierg 
Hill. Orders were issued for Prescott's, were proof against its influence With the 
Frye's, and Bridge's regiments, and a faticue advice of the council of vtAt General Ward 
party of two hundred Cimnerticut troops, issued orders to Col. Willi iin Presfott, Col. 
to parade at six o'clock in ilie evening, with Bridge, and tlie commandant of Fije's ret'i- 
all the entrenching tools in the Cambridge ment, to be prepared for an expedition, wi'h 
camp They were also ordered to furnish all ilieir men fit for service, and one day's 
themselves with parks and blankets, and provisions. The same order issued for one 
with provisions for twentyfour hours. Also, hundred and twenty o/ Ge^n. Pvtnavi^s regi- 
Captain Samuel Gridley's comriauy of artil- went, and (^apt. Gridley's company of artil- 
lery, of forty-nine men and two field-pieces, lery with two field pieces." p. 18. 
was ordered to parade. The Connecticut 
men, draughted from several companies, 
were put under the coynmand of the gaUaiit 
Captain Knowltnn, a captain in General Put- 
nam's regiment." p. 122. 



34 THK COMMAND IN THE 

These extracts will serve to show the character of such variations 
between the two narratives of the battle, as will be found to run through 
them. Other paragraphs might be quoted containing things of far more 
consequence. The variations as to the parts individuals bore, are also 
important. To do justice to the actors, they should be named in con- 
nection with the service they rendered. "SVith this in view, let the critical 
reader, as an illustration, compare the notices in the two accounts, of 
what the brave Knowlton did. ^Ir Swett's first and last mention of him, 
in describing the battle, is on p. 26, as follows : ""While the enemy were 
landing, Putnam ordered Knowlton with the Connecticut troops, to take 
post behind n rail fence." Passing the correctness of this, it is every 
syllable there is about Knowlton, \mtil p. ofi of the supplementary chap- 
ter, where there is, so far as this battle is concerned, only a general, but 
deserved, compliment to him. In the whole, the reader is not told that he 
had the command of the Connecticut fatigue party of two hundred, one 
fifth of the whole, or even went on at night. In the " Notes" of !Mr 
Swett, his name will be found to occur twice in depositions. Now is not 
Knowlton's well won reputation as dear as Putnam's or Prescott's ? ^Vith 
this, compare the notifies of him on pp. 122, 134, 136, lol, 189,190, of the 
Siege of Boston, which rest on authorities that are named. Before these 
details, or others that may differ in toto from ilr Swett's History, be 
unceremoniously shovelled aside as a "ihaos of mistakes," I have a right 
to demand that the authorities on ^hich they rest, shall go through the 
process first. 

It is then frankly admitted that the two histories, as far as they go on 
together, will not harmonize in their details. All that need be said on my 
part is, that an endeavor was made to frame the account in the Siege of 
Boston with care and with a partiality only for well directed effort, and 
lofty patriotism, and noble self sacdfice, by whomsoever manifested, going 
directly to original authorities in all cesses where it was practicable ; and at 
a risk of beijig charged with pedantry, references are made in notes to 
authorities, especially where this battle is described, that will justify every 
line of the text. It is these that are to decide who is most in error. The 
appeal is cheerfully and confidently made to the candid and unprejudiced. 
But whatever the judgment may be as to my selection of authorities, I feel 
incapable of manufacturing facts, or of intentionally disparaging the ser- 
vices, or of doing injustice to the reputation, of any of the patriots who 
took a part in the great work of the Revolution. 

Having thus done with Mr Swett, who really deserves much credit 
for his patriotic and indefatigable pioneer labors, and done, it is hoped, 
finally with controversy on this subject, this opportunity is embraced of 
making a few remarks on the character of the army and the commanding 



BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. 35 

officers of the battle of Bunker Hill. This is done thu more readily, as it 
will serve as an occasion to weave in additional contemporary matter, not 
in print, that may afford aid to a future enquirer in settling this question. 
The organization of the American army besieging the British army iu 
Boston at the time of the Battle of Bunker Hill, was peculiar. The Mas- 
sachusetts forces, though all of them had enlisted either as minute men, or 
as part of the quota of this colony, were less regularly organized, perhaps, 
than the troops of at least two of the other colonies. Several of the 
colonels, and other officers, had not been commissioned, and their rank had 
not been determined. Up to this time, and all through the records and 
the documents of the Provincial Congress, the forces of this province are 
called "The Massachusetts Army." General Ward's commission terms him 
the commander-in-chief of the Massachusetts forces, and he signs his 
name, June 4, as such. The troops of Rhode Island, under Brigadier 
General Greene, were also termed "The Khode Island Army" — and "The 
Army of Observation," and all the captures by it were to enure to the benefit 
of the colony of Khode Island. In like manner the Connecticut forces, 
under Brigadier General Spencer, (the senior officer,) and Putnam, were 
controlled by a Connecticut "committee of war" and all captures were to 
enure to the benefit of that colony. Rhode Island and Connecticut had 
not instructed their generals — June 17, 1775 — to put themselves under 
General Ward. The troops of New Hamphire were differently situated 
from those of the two other colonics. The minute men who flocked to the 
neighbourhood of Boston on the Lexington alarm, were advised by the 
New Hampshire officers to enlist in the service of the Massachusetts 
colony, until their colony could have time to act. These troops, then 
under Colonel Stark, were adopted by the New Hamj;shire Provincial 
Congress, (May 20th) and put under the command of Brigadier General 
Folsom. He did not arrive at camp until just after the battle, but he 
gave an order to Colonel Reed, whom the congress had also appointed 
colonel, to collect his regiment, a part of which was under Stark at Med- 
ford, and put himself under General Ward. The latter ordered him 
(June lo) to take post at Charlestown Neck. 

The facts relative to the army, whatever bearing they may have on tho 
question of command, show that it was an army of allies. The four New 
England colonies came together as equals, respecting each other's equality, 
and with no idea in one of claiming precedence over the others. The 
description of President John Adams is strictly correct, and is borne out 
by contemporay documents. "Massachusetts had her army, Connecticut 
her army. New Hampshire her army, and Pthodc Island her army. 
These four armies met together and imprisoned the British army in Bos- 
ton. But who was the sovereign of this united, or rather congregated 



36 TIli: COMMAND l.N XUK 

army ? It had none." And he goes on to remark, that the command- 
ing officers of each colony Avere independent of each other. Hence 
Elbridge Gerry (June i, 177-5) writes "We want a regular general to as- 
sist us in disciplining the army." Hence the " committee of war" of 
the colony of Connecticut, to remedy this evil of the want of a com- 
mander-in-chief, on June 19th, 177-5, considered the following important 
votes : — 

"On motion of the difficulties the army are and must be under for the 
want of a general and commander-in-chief of the whole body, raised by 
different colonies, &c., and a due subordination, in consideration, &c. 

"Voted, That his honor the governor be advised to give orders to our 
officers and soldiers to be subordinate and j-ield obedience to the general 
and commanding officer of the troops of the Massachusetts Bay, while they 
act in that province, and until the governor, with advice, shall see fit to 
order otherwise." 

On the next day (June 20, 177-5) the committee passed this order, when 
the votes were as follows : — 

"An order subjecting our officers and soldiers to the command of the 
Massachusetts commander-in-chief, during their continuance in that pro- 
vince, or until further orders, Avas read and agreed to. 

A letter to General Ward, informing him thereof, and endorsing a copy 
of said order, read and approved. 

A letter to Deputy Governor Cook, of Rhode Island, informing him 
of the same, and moving him to do the same respecting the troops of 
that colony, read and approved. 

A letter to the New Hampshire Congress of the like tenor and for the 
same purpose, also read and approved. 

A letter to General Spencer enclosing a copy of said order of subordina- 
tion, &c., read and approved. 

And another letter to the same purpose, and copy, to General Putnam." 
These facts certainly warrant the important inference, that there wa$ 
no regular commander-in-chief; that the evil of not having one had been 
felt ; and that it had been determined to apply the needed remedy, even 
as it regarded the four New England colonies. Besides this, the Pro- 
vincial Congress of Massachusetts (May .3) had siigijested to the Continental 
Congress (convened May 10) the expediency of raising " a powerful 
army :" and on the loth it had sent an express advising that body to 
assume the general direction and regulation of the forces besieging Bos- 
ton. Thus it was before the army had been consolidated, before there was 
a commander-in-chief "of the whole body," before the ranks of its offi- 
cers had been determined, and while it was in a transition state, that the 
Battle of Blinker Hill was fought. It was while the troops were imder 



BATTLE OF BUNKKR HILL. 37 

the control of the several colonics that had raised them, and before they 
had become as Washington's first order (July 4, 1775) terms them, "the 
troops of the United Provinces of North America." There v»-as groat 
want of disjiplinp, and there were many irregularities, but it gives a very 
erroneous idea of the army to term it a mob ; for even the hastily assem- 
bled bands that fought the British troops from Concord, on the Nineteenth 
of April, cannot justly be called an armed mob, but they were an organized 
power, set apart, and trained, to do the thorough and immortal work that 
was done that day. It also gives an idea quite as erroneous to term the 
army regularlj'' organized and consolidatfid. 

The operations of this army were decided by its general officers, — 
Ward, Thomas, Whitcomb, Pomeroy, Heath, Spencer, Putnam, Greene, 
and perhaps others, — convened in council, and hence called "The council 
of war." The Massachusetts committee of safety had no power over it as 
a whole, though it was clothed with ample authority to control the Massa- 
chusetts generals. Thus when it acted in the important matter of occupy- 
ing Bunker Hill, it passed but an advisory vote. The ultimate, directing 
power was in the council of war. It is however stated, that the orders 
of the day were copied by all the troops, and that a voluntary obedience 
was yielded to General Ward as the commander-in-chief. 

The immediate occasion of this battle hardly needs a passing remark. 
" I'he commanders of the Ncio England Army" (the words of the committee 
of safety account,) received authentic advice that the British intended to 
penetrate into the country ; when the Massachusetts committee of safety 
(June L5) unanimou.-ly recommended to the council of war to occupy 
Bunker Hill. This recommendation was complied with. Hence the 
building of the memorable redoubt. The object of the British was to 
diive the Americans from it. 

The remarks that follow are not designed to present a narrative of the 
battle, but as suggestions that may aid in showing more precisely its 
character, and the agency that general officers exercised in it. 

Artemas Ward, the commander of the Massachusetts army, graduated 
at Harvard University in 1748, had been a firm and useful member of the 
general court and provincial congress, and had also seen service in the 
military line. He was major in the Canada expedition of 17oS, and the 
next year was appointed colonel, but he had the honor of having it re- 
voked by the royal governor on account of his prominence in the patriot 
cause. When forcible resistance had been resolved on, and the first pro- 
vincial congress, (October 1774) took such admirable measures to keep 
the patriot cause free from any thing like mob action, it appointed huu 
(Ojt. 27, 1774) one of the generals to command, what then M-as very 
properly called "the ronslitnihitni army," nr minute men, or militiu, 



38 THK COMMAND IN THE 

"whenever the committee of safety should call them out to defend the colo- 
ny. He was reelected Feb. 9, 177<), and in a long resolve commencing as 
follows : — " That the Honorable Jedediah Preble, Esq., Honorable Arte- 
mas Ward, Esq., Colonel Seth Pomeroy, Colonel John Thomas, and 
Colonel William Heath, be and they are, hereby appointed general offi- 
cers," &c. Preble declined, which left Ward the highest ofhcer, and 
accordingly when the minute men were summoned to the field on the 
nineteenth of April, he on the next day took the command. But his com- 
mission was not delivered to him until May 20, 1775, and it constituted 
him general and commander-in-chief of all the forces raised by the Mas- 
sachusetts provincial congress ; and it instructed him to obey the direc- 
tions of the committee of safety. General Ward had gained distinction 
in Canada, was of great integrity of character, was a calm, cool, intrepid 
man, and ranked high in public estimation ; but he was thought to 
be a better civilian than general. 

General Ward's headquarters were at Cambridge on the daj' of the 
battle. It is represented that, in the council of war, his opinion was 
decidedly adverse to the measure of occupying so exposed a post as Bunker 
Hill, and this would be in keeping with his cautious character. At any 
rate, so thought the majority of this council, until the resolution was 
suddenly taken (June 15) to occupy this hill. Few contemporary allu- 
sions occur as to Ward's personal agency in the battle. Dr Belknap's 
Diary (Oct. 20, 1775) supplies one: — "In conversation with Mr Ward at 
Roxbury, I learned that the reason of our throwing up the entrenchment 
at Charlestown, on the night of the IGth June, was, that there had been 
intelligence received, such as could be depended on, that the regulars had 
determined to make a push for Cambridge after the arrival of their three 
generals and reinforcements, who landed a few days before." There is 
nothing satisfactory to show that General Ward did not concur with this 
decision of the council of war. 

His orderly book contains no orders relative to the expedition ; but 
Fenno's, contains a copy of the order issued to the Massachusetts forces to 
parade. It was as follows: "June 16. Frye's, Bridge's and William 
Prescott's regiments to parade this evening at six o'clock, with all the 
entrenching tools in this encampment." This order, it will be noticed, did 
not include the Connecticut forces, which were also ordered to parade at 
this time. Now depositions say, that General Putnam ordered these to 
parade. They did not consist of a company under the command of Cap- 
tain Knowlton, and were not all from one regiment, but were ordered by 
Putnam to be drau<;hted out of several companies ; and the next day, 
when more Connecticut troops were ordered on, the fact is given by 
r^hcstcr, that Putnam also ordered them on. But contemporary authorities 



BATTLE OF BUNKKR HILT.. 3!> 

and depositions, unite in the fact, that the orders for the troops of New 
Hampshire and Massachusetts to go on, went directly from General AVard. 
Thus Colonel Stark, (June 20, 177o) states that he "teas required by the. 
General" to send a party to Bunker Hill. So Prescott received his orders 
from Ward, and when he applied for reinforcements, it was directly to 
him. The orders of Ward to the forces of these two colonies, therefore, 
did not (JO through amj other officer, as they would have done had one 
been specially detached to exercise a general command. 

Throughout the action Gen. Ward had constant and frequent communi- 
cations with Charlestown. Henry Knox, afterward General Knox, and, 
Samuel Osgood, acted as his aids. Col. Joseph Gilbert is named in the 
newspapers as having "at the request of General Ward" freely exposed 
his life on this day by crossing the Neck several times "in the time of 
action and under a galling fire to carry intelligence to and from headquar- 
ters " But Ward remained at Cambridge. He considered the attack on 
the redoubt as only a part of the object of the British general, but that 
his main object was to march out of Boston, attack his stores, break up 
his army, and then proceed to Charlestown Neck, and enclose the Amer- 
icans in the peninsula. It was not until the intentions of the British 
general were clearly revealed, that he detached large reinforcements to 
Charlestown. Such is the statement made by General Ward's friends. 
And had the valor of the patriot band on Breed's Hill been less, the 
greater might have been the estimate placed on Ward's judgment. 

The circumstances already stated, with others that might be named, 
would seem to indicate that General Ward controlled the movements in 
such a way, that he may be regarded as the general commander, if any 
one can be so regarded. This view is supported by several allusions that 
occur to him in contemporary letters. It should be borne in mind that 
the result of the battle, the loss of the ground, occasioned great indigna- 
tion, and naturally gave rise to much unfavorable comment. In some of 
this comment General Ward is spoken of as the direct commander of 
the battle. I will name here as one instance, a letter of James Warren, 
(June 20, 1775) who was elected president of the Massachusetts provin- 
cial congress, in the place of Joseph AVarren. He regards him and 
writes of him as the commander. 

General Ward was in long and important service subsequently to the 
battle. He was appointed by the continental congress first major general, 
commanded the right wing of the army during the Siege of Boston, and 
was left in command of the eastern department on the removal of Wash- 
igton to New York. He soon resigned his commission, but at the request 
of congress, continued in service until the close of the year. He subse- 
qnentn- filled most, responsible offices, bring in 1777 president of the 



40 THK COMMAND IN THK 

executive council of the colon}', in 177i) a member of the continental 
congress, in 1788 speaker of the Massachusetts house of representatives, 
and sixteen years a representative of the town of Shrcwfrbury. He died 
October 27, 1800, age 7-5, leavi\ig behind him an unblemished character, 
and a name "precious among the friends of liberty and religion." 

John Whitcorab was the officer next in rank who gave orders on the day 
of the battle He was chosen general by the provincial congress, Feb. 15, 
1775. He was an old veteran— took the field promptly on the nine 
teenth of April, and, according to the orderly books, was one of the three 
generals who formed the first council of war convened on the 20th of 
April, at Cambridge. He was one of the sterling, disinterested, unedu- 
cated patriot officers of the early revolution, and appears to have enjoyed 
to a great degree the respect and confidence of his contrmnoraiies; and 
so valuable were his services considered that when the provincial congress 
resolved, June 12, to elect two major generals, on the next day (13th,) they 
elected him the " first major general." He expressed an unwillingness 
to accept this appointment, but on a " complaisant letter," dated June 
16, being sent to him by order of congress, strongly urging his acceptance, 
the brave patriot replied, that " as the circumstances of the army were so 
difficult and the enemy so near" he would accept. He was not com- 
missioned, however, until the 2.jd of June. Put if Warren is to be con- 
sidered a major general — and his commission is to date from the day of his 
appointment — so is Whitcomb. Indeed the evidence in Scammans's 
rrial shows that he was on duty on the 17th, and gave orders in the 
afternoon. A letter of Samuel Gray, July 12, 1775, states that two gener- 
als and the engineer went on to Breed's Hill on the night of June 16, and 
reconnoitred the ground. One of them, certainlj-, was General Put- 
nam, and the other might have been General Whitcomb. There is no 
mention, however, of his having been in the battle, and no special ser- 
vice appears in connection with his name. He was certainly in the field 
that day, gave orders, and was also the officer n?xt in rank to General 
Ward at Cambridge. 

Joseph Warren was the officer next in rank, having been on 14th 
of June elected the second major general of the JIussachusetis army. It 
is not necessary here to recount his history ; but no one represented more 
completely the fine cnthu-^iasm iuul the sclf-saoriricirsg patriotism that 
rallied to the support of the revolution, end no one saw more clearly the 
great principle ir.volved in the contest. If he was of a high, chivalrous 
spirit, and of fascmating social qualities, he had also a judgment beyond 
his years, and wielded surpiising influence with his contemporaries. He 
had been an active and most efficient working patriot, in the civil line, and 
as .such ho acted, as president of the Massachusetts provincial congress aiid 



BATTI,F. or BUNKER HII.I,. 41 

member of the committee of safety up to the day, and almost to the hour 
of his death. He had twice exposed his life in the battle field, once 
on the Lexington day, when he is said to have been the most active man 
on the field, and again at j^oddle's Island in May, under General Putnam, 
yet it was as a volunteer and without a command ; and there is nothing on 
the records of the provincial congress, or among its documents, to indicate 
that a commission as major general had been made out for him, or that 
he had accepted this appointment ; nor does his name appear on such 
orderly books, as I have seen ; neither is it stated that General Ward 
ordered him, on the 17th of June, to Charlestown, but on the contrary, his 
friends were urgent in their entreaties that his valuable life should not be 
exposed in battle. He went voluntarily, deaf to the most aff"ectionate 
remonstrances, listening only to the call of patriotic duty, in his own lofty 
spirit of self-sacrifice, and to give the patriot band when it was in peril the 
benefit of his presence. He went on, in his own simple words, uttered 
after he got to the redoubt, <'To encourage a good cause." On his 
way from Cambridge he armed himself with a musket, took position in 
the redoubt, and declined to give orders to Colonel Prescott. Here I quote 
an entire note in Judge Prescott' s MS. Memoir. It indicates the cautious 
manner in which that eminent man wrote on this interesing subject : — 
♦'General Warren came to the redoubt a short time before the action 
commenced with a musket in his hand. Col. Prescott went to him and 
proposed that he should take the command, observing, he understood he 
had been appointed a major general a day or two before, by the provincial 
congress. General Warren replied, 'I shall take no command here, I have 
not yet received my commission ; I came as a volunteer with my musket 
to serve under you, and shall be happy to learn from a soldier of your 
experience.' General Warren fought gallantly with his musket, and un- 
fortunately for his country, fell ; but, whether killed during the battle 
or on the retreat, is made a question. I believe it was just after he left 
the redoubt, but am not positive that I ever heard my father state it." 

Deacon Samuel Lawrence, of Groton — the father of the Hon. Abbott 
Lawrence — who went on under Colonel Prescott, aided in raising the 
redoubt, was in it during the whole battle until the retreat, and whose 
subsequent life was marked by great usefulness, integrity, and public spirit, 
says of General Warren — " Just before the battle commenced Gen. Warren 
came to the redoubt. He had on a blue coat and white waistcoat, and, 
I think, a cocked hat, but of this I am not certain. Colonel Prescott ad- 
vanced to him, said ' He Avas glad to see him, and hoped he would take 
the command.' General Warren replied — 'No, he came to see the action, 
but not to take the command ; that he was only a volunteer on that day.' " 
He further states — " I knew General Warren well by sight, and recollected 
him perfectly when Colonel Prescott oifcrcd him the command, and was 

6 



42 THE COMMAND IN THE 

Borry to spo him so dangerously situated, as I knew him to be a distin- 
guished character, and thought he ought not to have risked his life without 
■command on that occasion."' 

The deiormined spirit with which the leading officers went into this 
battle could hardly have boon exceeded. Putnam, Pomeroy, and Stark 
were veterans beyond fear, and their names had become associated with 
daring enterprise. Prescott went on to the hill on the night of June 16th, 
with the resolution not to be taken alive — " I will never be taken alive," 
he had remarked. *' The tories shall never have the satisfaction of seeing 
me hanged." \Varren's high spirit had been often stirred by the taunts 
which the British officers were wont to indulge against the colonists. 
Indeed he felt them as keenly as though they had been personal insults. 
It was only a few weeks before the battle, that he remarked to William 
Eustis, afterwards governor, at a moment when his spirit was galled by 
such insolence : '* These fellows saj' we won't fight ! By heavens, I hope 
I shall die up to my knees in blood." The report at first was that he 
disdained to fly. Mr B.mcroft, during his late residence abroad, got the 
account of the battle which the French ambassador in London sent to 
Vcrgennes, the French minister, which gives, with much particularity, an 
account of the battle. It says — "II (Warren) a refuse de le (Putnam) 
suivre dans sa retraite ; il est reste lui septieme dans Ics entrenchments 
de Charlestown et n' a pas voulu accepter de quartier." " He (Warren) 
refused to follow him (Putnam) in the retreat ; he remained one of seven 
in the entrenchments at Charlestown and would not accept quarter." 
General Ward (October 20, 1775) told Dr Bellcnap—" That Dr Warren 
was the last man in the trenches after they were forced, and died on the 
breastwork with his sword in his hand. That his body was stripped 
naked, and buried so ; his coat was sold in Boston by a soldier for eight 
dollars. His body was dug up several times, and buried again, to gratify 
the curiosity of those who came to see it." In connection with the death 
of Warren is the chivalric act attributed to the British Major Small, 
(which figures so largely in Trumbull's picture,) who, in return for a 
similar service which General Putnam had rendered him in the battle, it is 
said, endeavored to save Warren's life. The whole relation, however, about 
Major Small, bears too much the aspect of romance to be relied upon. 

The most probable account, of the many accounts of his fall, is, that he 
■was killed early in the retreat, just outside the trenches. As the con- 
temporary notices of his death are interesting, a few more of them are 
here quoted : — 

The Kemembrancer, (British) vol. 1, p. 250, says — "When the pro- 
vincials were retreating, of the three concurring circumstances, Charles- 
town being on fire, the ships cannonading, and the regulars advancing, the 
Doctor, with that intrepidity and contempt of danger which peculiarly 



BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. 43 

marked his character, stood alone for some time, endeavoring to ralfy th« 
troops and animate them by his example. He was obscived in thia situ- 
ation, and known by an officer in the regulars, who, wresting a maske' 
out of the hands of one of his men, took aim, and lodged a bullet in hia 
breast, of which he expired without a pang." 

A British lieutenant in the battle, John Clarke, in his pamphlet accoimt, 
printed in London, 177o, writes as follows of Dr Warren : — 

" A report having prevailed that Dr Warren was not killed, I think it 
necessary to contradict it, as I saw a soldier, after the Doctor was wound- 
ed and lying in the trenches, going to run him through tlio body with 
his bayonet; on which the Doctor desired he would not kill hini, for ho 
was much wounded and could not live a great while longer ; on whicih 
the soldier swore that he would, for that he had done more mischief than 
any one else, and immediately run him through the body. The Doctor" :< 
dress was a light-colored coat, with a white satin waittcoat laced with 
silver, and white breeches with silver loops; which I saw the soldier 
soon after stqp oft' his body. He was supposed to be the commander of 
the American army that day ; for General Putnam was about throe miles 
distant, and formed an ambuscade with about three thousatid men." 

If John Clarke could stand idle and see this barbarity, he must have 
been a liend in human form. Both of these British accounts cannot be 
true. 

James Warren, MS. letter, June 20, 177-), saj's: "Here fell our worthy 
and much lamented friend Dr W^arren, with as much glory as Wolfe on 
the plains of Abraham, after performing many feats of bravery, and exhib- 
iting a coolness and conduct which did honor to the judgment of his 
country in appointing him a few days before one of their major generals ; 
at once admired and lamented in such a manner as to make it difficult to 
determine whether regret or envy predominates." 

J. Palmer, Cambridge, MS., June 19, 1775, says : "We yet have about 
GO or 70 killed and missing ; but — among these, is — what shall I say ? 
How shall I write the name of our worthy friend, the great and good D'' 
W . You will hear by others who will write to-morrow, such partic- 
ulars as I am not possessed of." 

William Tudor, MS., June 26, 177'), writes: — "The loss of Dr Warren 
is irreijarable — his death is generally and greatly lamented. But 

'Diilce et decorum e^^t pro patria inori.' 
This is a day of heroes. The fall of one will inspire the surviving glo- 
rious band to emulate his virtues and revenge his death on the foes of 
liberty and our country "* 

Immediately after the battle it was reported in Boston that Dr Warren 
had the command during the action, and statements to this effect Avere 
written to England. Hence, in nearly all the British accounts, this 

* I am inilebted to Hon. Charlee Fianci* Adams for the three letter? from which thes* 
fxirarts are riiiide. 



44 THt; COMMAND IN THE 

honor is awarded to him. The same thing is stated in some of the alma- 
nacks of 1776. George's Cambridge Almanack, or the Essex Calendar 
for 177G, says that he was the "commander in chief on the occasion." 
The same account was printed in a handbill, with a parcel of wretched 
rhyme, some of which also appeared in the newspapers. Governor Trum- 
bull, of Connecticut, in his Historical Letter, printed in vol. YI. of the 
Massachusetts Historical Collection, dated August 31, 1779, gives an ac- 
count of the action, and states that "the brave General Warren" was the 
"commanding officer." The same thing is stated in a History of the War 
in America, published by Coverly & Hodge in Boston in 1781, and is 
repeated in an account in the Analectic Magazine, (1818,) where it is 
stated that "General Putnam directed the whole on the fall of General 
Warren." 

That General Warren, in being present, and behaving so heroically, 
exerted great influence in the battle by infusing his own spirit into the 
patriot band, cannot be doiibtcd. He acted, however, only as a vol- 
unteer. There is no reliable account which states that Ml.assumed any 
command — that he performed any military duty in the army previous to 
the battle, or that he gave an order during the engagement. He was in 
the redoubt, and Colonel Prescott's letter makes it certain that here he 
(Prescott) commanded throughout the action. 

Seth Pomeroy was the next officer in rank, as he was the oldest officer, 
being one of the first generals elected. He was one of the intrepid vete- 
rans of the French wars, having commanded a company under Sir William 
Johnson, when he defeated the army under Baron Dieskau. He exerted 
large influence in Hampshire county, and had a marked character for 
intrepidity, generosity, frankness and patriotism. He was a delegate in 
the first and second provincial congress from Northampton, and a col- 
league with the celebrated Major Hawley. His name often appears on 
important committees. He was elected a general officer Oct. 27, 1774, 
and again Feb. 9, 1775 ; and probably preferring military service, was 
not returned a delegate to the third provincial congress, which met on the 
31st of May, 1775. He aided in organizing the army that assembled at 
Cambridge to besiege the British army, and was in service at the time of 
the battle. It is stated that he had not received a commission in the Mas- 
sachusetts army, as Ward and Thomas had, but served under " his old 
commission ;" but the authority for this is not given. I have met with 
but few authentic notices of him in connection with the battle. But it is 
admitted that he went on to the field as a volunteer, and though he ranked 
above Putnam, there is no evidence that he gave him an order. He is 
said to have borrowed a horse of General Ward to carry him on; but on 
arriving at Charlestown Neck, and seeing the severe fire that raked it, he 
refused to risk the borrowed animal, but walked across. He fought with 



BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. 45 

;i musket at the rail fence breastwork. He behaved bravely during the 
battle, and in some accounts, figures as the commander of a brigade. But 
ho appears to have had no special command. He was elected a brigadier 
general by the continental congress, but declined on account of his age. 

Israel Putnam, of Connecticut, was the general next in rank stationed 
at Cambridge. Not an officer of the army, if Warren be excepted, had a 
larger measure of popularity. His daring exploits at home, and on the 
Canada frontier, had established his character for bravery, while his pub- 
lic spirit and efficient political action, on trying occasions during the ten 
years controversy from 1764 to 1775, had made him widely known as a 
decided and bold patriot. But it is unnecessary to relate his history. 
The Connecticut assembly, in April, made him a brigadier general, and he 
was second in command of the forces of that colony. At the time of the 
battle of Bunker Hill, the greater part of these forces was stationed at 
Cambridge — the remainder, under General Spencer, the senior officer, was 
at Roxbury. It was not, I think, until subsequently to the battle, that 
Patterson's, Sargent's, and other regiments (Mass.) were placed under his 
command. 

No reliable contemporary account states that the detachment which was 
detailed to take possession of Bunker Hill, was placed under the orders 
of General Putnam, or gives him by express agreement the superinten- 
dence of the whole expedition, or puts Col. Prescott under him. On the 
other hand, the negative evidence is decisive and conclusive. Scammans 
writes as though it were well known that there was no general officer in 
command ; James Thatcher states that though several general officers 
came on to the field, no one assumed the command ; William Tudor says 
there was no authorised general command ; and Judge Prescott says that 
neither General Putnam nor any other officer claimed or exercised any 
command over Prescott. It is also a singular fact, that the patriot govern- 
or of Connecticut, Governor Trumbull, the head of the committee of war 
of that colony, under whose direct orders Spencer and Putnam acted, who 
speaks in the most friendly manner of Putnam in his letters, who would 
be likely to know the fact if he had commanded, and to claim the 
honor for his colony if he justly could, yet in his historical letter 
(Aug. 31, 1779) names General Warren as the commanding officer. Gen- 
eral Putnam, too, in a letter dated May 22, 1776, speaks of venturing 
"his life in the high places of the field," and of "taking possession of 
Prospect Hill the very night after the fight on Bunker Hill, u-ithoiU 
having any orders from any person." This does not indicate that he was 
the commander in this fight, or had entrusted to him the whole direction 
of the expedition. Nor does the relation that Stiles has given — already 
quoted — indicate such a responsibility ; but if it indicates any thing, it is 
that he was not responsible for the result. To all this must be added the 



46 THK COMMAND IN THE 

Oecisive ne.;al;vete~-timony cf the letter of General Ward, which is clearly 
to the point, that a Massachusetts officer conducted the battle. 

In order to show how decided is the denial that General Putnam was 
detached to exercise a general command, or that the original detachment 
was put under his orders, or that he gave an order to Col. Prescott, I now 
.'idd the following extract of a letter of the late Judge 'William Prescott, 
the son of Colonel Prescott, which has not before been printed. It is 
appended to his MS. memoir of the battle. After remarking on Mr. 
Swett's history, he says (October 30, 1838) — 

"There is one (fact) however, in which I cannot concur with the state- 
ment in the history. This, as I understand it, represents that General 
Putnam had the command of all the troops engaged in the action. I 
have not the smallest disposition to disparage Gen. P. or his services, but 
I believe no authority or reason can be found for this supposition, other 
than his rank, and that he was on the heights during the battle. 

The detachment that marched from Cambridge the night before, includ- 
ing the one hundred and twenty Connecticut men, was placed under the 
command of Colonel Prescott, by an order in writing from the commander- 
in-chief, with instructions to proceed to Bunker Hill and fortify it till 
relieved. Colonel Prescott conferred with his officers and Colonel Gridley 
^^ General Putnam might be present) as to the place intended for the for- 
tification ; but Colonel l*rescott took oh himself the responsibility of de- 
ciding, as well he might, for on him it would rest. 

I know from evidence that with me is conclusive, that General Putnam 
never exercised any authority over this detachment, or any part of it ; 
and that he never at any time, before, during, or after the battle, gave 
an order or command to Colonel Prescott." 

These authorities and facts in the case are put together without the 
slightest disposition to do injustice to this brave old general. Still, if 
there be any authority. In manuscript or in print, between June 1775 and 
May 1790, which assigns to him the command of the original detach- 
ment, or of the battle of Bunker Hill, let it be produced. 

But General Putnam had been an efficient officer since the rustic army 
j^athered at Cambridge, was one of the council of war, is understood 
to have been in favor of fortifying Bunker Hill, and was the last to shrink 
from a perilous enterprise. His patriotic zeal carried him to the heights 
during the watches of the memorable night when the redoubt was built, 
and also early on the next day, to give the entrenching party the benefit of 
his presence and council ; and this carried him also into the heat of the 
fight, at the commencement, at the rail fence — at its conclusion, on the 
brow of Bunker Hill. The contemporary accounts that name him in 
connection with the battle, harmonize as to the nature of his service. 
Chester gives the fact that about noon he ordered on all the Connecticut 



BA.TTI-C OF BUNKER HILL. 47 

troops at Cambridge ; Martin states that he came on with a reinforce- 
ment ; Gordon states tliat he was employed in aiding and encouraging the 
troops here and there, as the case required; Pitts states that he was em- 
ployed in collecting the men ; and "Williams (secretary of the Connecti- 
cut committee of war) states he received it that he commanded the troops, 
perhaps not in chief. And thus, while the negative testimony is againsi. 
the idea of his being detached to exercise a general command, that of a 
positive cast is that as a general officer he acted the part of an aid, ai\ 
assistant, a volunteer. 

And in scuh capacity he did his duty fearlessly, faithfully, well. He was 
on horseback, and rode quickly from place to place.* Ilis main service- 
was in connection with the reinforcements. He gave orders to them, not 
in the redoubt, not, I think, near the redoubt, but at the rail fence, and on 
Bunker Hill, and in the rear of this. He stated himself — so Stiles says — 
that there was "a reinforcement within half a mile " that ought to havp 
gone on to the hill, but the heavy fire at " the open causeway " deterred 
it, and that " in the heat of the action he )yent away to fetch across thU 
reinforcement." Now this service is consistent with the duty of a patriotic 
volunteer " collecting men," but is it consistent Avith the duty of a respon- 
sible commander, ordering a battle ? What would be thought of a general, 
who, in the heat of an action, should leave the field, and go half a mile after 
a reinforcement, and not get back until a retreat had commenced ? Is it 
not at considerable hazard to General Putnam's reputation that, with such 
contemporary evidence to meet as there is in this case — the authenticity 
of which cannot be successfully impugned — the position is maintained that 
he was the immediate and responsible commander of this battle ? But to 
return: General Putnam most probably left the hill after the first attack. 
He next is seen braving the balls at Charlestown Neck, and, in the rear of it, 
urging on the backward troops. Thus Samuel Bassett says he came in full 
gallop to Ploughed Hill (Mount Benedict) from the neck, (which, probably, 
was after the first attack) exclaiming, " Up my brave boys, for God's sake ! 

* Here I quote an extract from p. 169 of the Siei-ie of Boston. To sustain the statement 
I have before me several pages (MS.) in which tlie notices of General Putnam's move- 
ments to be found in the soldiers' statements, are compared with sucii contemporary 
notices of his conduct as I have been able to glean. I see no cause to alter a line of it: — 
" The mass of matter relative to General Putnam's movements on this day presents the 
following account of them as tlie most probable. On the evening of June 10, he joined 
the detachment at Charlestown Meclc; took part in the consultation as to the place to 
be fortified; returned in the night to Cambridge; went to the heights on the firing of 
the Lively, but immediately relumed to Caml)ridge; went again lo tlie heights about ten 
o'clock; was in Cambridge after the British liniled; ordered on the Connecticut troops, 
and then went to the heights; was at the rail fence at the time tlie action commenced; 
was in the heat of the battle, and duriiig its continuance made great etTorts to induce 
the reinforcements to advance to the lines; urged labor on works at Bunker Hill; was on 
the brow of this hill when the retreat took place; retreated with that part of the army that 
went to Prospect Hill, and remained here through the night. He was on horseback, and in 
a few minutes' space of time could be not oLily in any part of the heights, but even at 
Cambridge. It is not, therefore, at all strange, that statements made by the soldiers as to 
the time when, and the place where, they saw the general, amid the confusion of so 
terrific a scene, cannot be reconciled ; and more especially as these statements were made 
after an expiration of forty or fifty years." 



48 THE COMMAND IN THE 

AVc drive them ;" and Sargent and Cooke say that he was at Prospect Hill, 
at an hour and under circumstances, which must have been while the battle 
was going on. Here the contemporary evidence (Stiles and Pitts) and the 
soldiers' statements (Bassett, Sargent and Cooke) harmonize. The retreat 
(Stiles says) had commenced before he got back. But he must soon have 
rode to Bunker Hill, for he is found here by a messenger Col. Scammans 
sent; and when his regiment got to this hill he ordered it forward. On the 
brow of this hill, where there was hot fighting, he put himself between the 
retreating throng and the advancing enemy ; and, regardless of personal 
danger, he urged the flying troops to stop. " Make a stand here I" he 
exclaimed, " We can stop them yet ! In God's name form ! and give them 
one shot more !" There are other circumstances that will harmonize with 
this detail ; and if it will not furnish a stage on which to act the Major 
Small romance — where Putnam saves Small's life — all that need be said is, 
that it is time to ignore some of the romance that has accumulated about 
the battle of Bunker Hill. 

In all this. General Putnam acted as a :;eneral officer would have acted. 
He gave orders, undoubtedly, not only to the Connecticut officers and 
troops, over whom he had a specific command, but to others over whom he 
had no special command. If it be true that even in an army of allies the 
oldest or highest officer ranks, still it is also true there must be the 
requisite discipline, regularity and subordination, to allow this principle to 
operate, and that the officer who appears on a field of battle to take the 
command from an inferior officer, must be ordered on by his superior. 
Such in either particular is not the case here. Every thing was in an 
irregular, half- organized, transition state, and there is no more evidence 
that "Ward ordered Putnam on than that he ordered Pomeroy (his senior) 
or Warren on. Besides ; he was neither the highest nor oldest allied 
officer, for Whitcomb, Warren, and Pomeroy ranked him. Indeed it has 
been stated, by those defending Putnam, that Ward could not order him 
on. Thus Hon. John Lowell remarks : " It is certainly true that there 
could not in the nature of the case have been any authorized commander." 
General Putnam might give orders, even accompany them with threats, 
and yet not be detached to supercede Prescott. In so trying a scene, an 
officer so popular on being seen in the field, would naturally be looked up 
to for advice and applied to for orders. A case in point is that of Arnold 
at Saratoga. He was only not ordered by Gates on to the field, but was 
actually under arrest, yet seeing the necessity of prompt and decisive 
action, he galloped about, giving orders, leading on the troops, and was 
obeyed as though he were ordered on. So with General Putnam during 
the Bunker Hill battle. He rode about from place to place, cheering all 
with whom he came in contact, " aiding and encouraging where the case 
required." Rome of the officers and troops not under his immediate com- 



RATTT.F, OF UrNKF.U HJI.T.. ^9 

jnand respected his authority, while others refused to obey him. Some of 
the Connecticut forces whom he ordered to the field, did a brilliant ser- 
vice, apd indeed no service was more brilliant ; but some of the Massachu- 
setts forces, whom he labored hard to get into the battle, behaved badly. 
Indeed in the afternoon, during the battle, and in the rear of Bunker Hill, 
there w^as great confusion, as Captain Chester's excellent and life-like let- 
ter (July 12, 177'j) firmly establishes. Tiuit den. Putnam was not success- 
ful in getting these backward troops into action, in sheer justice, ought to 
be ascribed neither to his lack of energy nor of conduct, but to the hesitan- 
cy of inexperienced troops, to the want of spirit in some of their officers, 
and to the general lack of discipline and subordination in the army. Gen- 
eral Putnam was not blamed for this at the time, but on the contrary, his 
services as an officer throughout the siege are spoken of in letters in 
terms of lively approbation. Indeed among all the documents of the 
time — I mean those I have seen— in print or in manuscript, there is not a 
disparaging remark on his services this day ; and none occur until the 
unjust comments made bj' General Wilkinson in his memoirs, printed in 
IS 1(1. Still, to represent that the detachment sent to Bunker Hill was un- 
der his command, and that Colonel Preseott acted under his orders, is to 
contradict the most positive evidence and violate the integrity of history. 
William Preseott was one of the French war veterans. He served as a 
lieutenant of a company under General Winslow at the capture of Cape 
Breton, and so decided was the military talent he displa^'ed, that he at- 
tracted the particular notice of the British commander-in-chief, who urged 
him to accept a commission of a lieutenancy in the regular army. This he 
declined, as he was unwilling to adopt a military profession and leave his 
native country. He was born in Groton, but he lived in that part of it 
which was set off, and became Pepperell. Here he took a prominent 
part in the questions that arose between the colonies and the mother 
country, and on the popular side. He represented Pepperell in the cele- 
brated convention of committees held in Boston in 1768, in the convention 
of Middlesex county Aug. 30, 1774, when the boldest measures were de- 
termined upon, and in the provincial congress of October. He is called 
on the records of this congress Captain AV'illiam Preseott. He was not a 
member at the time of the battle. He had been also chairman of the Pep- 
perell committee of safety. lie was chosen colonel of the minute men, 
when they organized agreeably to the advice of the provincial congress, and 
it was in this capacity that, on the " Lexiagton Alarm," he hastened at the 
head of his men to Cambridge, and acted as one of the members of the first 
council of war. To him were assigned some of the earliest duties of the 
campaign. On the 27th of May he received a colonel's commission in 
" the Massachusetts army," being then about fifty years of age. 

Among the Massachusetts colonels there was, at that time, no one more 

7 



50 THE COMMAND IN THE 

distinguished, both in the civil and military line, than Colonel Prescott, 
And when the resolution to occupy Bunker Hill, so unanimously advised 
by the Massachusetts committee of safety, -was so suddenly taken by the 
council of war, the selection of an officer to perform this service could not 
have fallen upon a patriot of f^reater decision of character, or a soldier of 
more dauntless resolution. His established reputation furnishes a suffi- 
cient reason for his being selected for so dangerous and trying a duty. 
Though in the afternoon of June 16, his regiment, withFrye's and Bridge's, 
was required to parade at six o'clock, yet it was not until evening that he 
received orders in writing to take the command of a detachment. He 
received them directly from General Ward. They required him to pro- 
ceed, at the head of his detachment, to Bunker Hill, and there erect such 
fortifications as he and Colonel Gridley — the chief engineer of the Massa- 
chusetts army — should judge proper for its defence ; and he was instruct- 
ed not to communicate his orders until after he had passed Charlcstown 
Neck. Thus he was regularly detached for a special service, and as such 
marched at the head of his troops. " General Putnam " — so Judge Prescott 
expressly states from information from his father — " did not head the de- 
tachment from Cambridge to Bunker Hill, nor march with it." It was 
under the entire command of Colonel Prescott. 

In all the evidence, it is only twice that Colonel Prescott, up to about 
the time of the attack, appears in consultation with general officers : 
once in the night, in reference to the place to be fortified, and once just 
before the enemy made his first landing, in reference to the removal of 
the entrenching tools. It may be well to look at both these cases. 

When Colonel Prescott, in the evening of June 16th, arrived at Charles- 
town Neck, he halted, and sent a small party, under Captain Nutting, to 
the lower part of the town, to serve as a guard. He soon marched over to 
Bunker Hill, and again halted. It was here, probably, that he communi- 
i-ated his orders to his officers, and held a consultation as to the place to 
he fortified. Other officers, who did not march with the detachment, 
were present, and took part in the discussion. Samuel Gray (Letter July 
12, 177o,) gives the best account of what took place. He states that "the 
engineer and two generals went on to the hill at night, and reconnoitred 
the ground ; that one general and the engineer were of opinion we ought 
not to entrench on Charlcstown Hill (Breed's Hill) till we had thrown up 
.Home works on the north and south ends of Bunker Hill, to cover our men 
in their retreat, if that should happen ; but on the pressing importunity 
-jf the other general officer it was consented to begin as was done." One 
of these generals was General Putnam. There is no data to determine 
who the other was, but rather from the estimation which Gen. \Vhit- 
comb's character was held, his recent appointment as major general, and 
tht' fact he was on active duty, than from anything else, it may be infer- 



BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. 51 

red that he was the general. No account states that Colonel Prescott here 
received an order ; but Judge Prescott does say that the responsibility of 
the decision rested with him. When the troops got to the spot, so Pres- 
cott states, «<the lines were drawn by the engineer." After the men were 
at labor General Putnam, and probably the other general, returned to 
Cambridge. 

The other instance, which was before the British landed, occurred be- 
tween eleven and twelve o'clock in the forenoon. The men had mostly 
ceased to labor on the entrenchments, and the entrenching tools had been 
piled in the rear of them. General Putnam rode on horseback to the re- 
doubt, and consulted Colonel Prescott relative to beginning works on 
Bunker Hill ; he also remarked to the colonel that the entrenching tools 
ought to be sent off or they might be lost. General Heath first relates 
this circumstance, and he is supported by the depositions of several soldiers. 
Col. Prescott replied that if he (Prescott) sent any of the men away not 
one of them would return. To this Putnam repUed, "they shall everv 
man return." "A large party," Heath says, "was then sent off with the 
tools, and not one of them returned. In this instance the colonel was the 
best judge of human nature." No order was given to Colonel Prescott, 
and the collision of opinion was merely as to whether the men would 
return to the redoubt. It is probable, by the way, that this affair of the 
tools is the kernel of truth there is in the stories told of Putnam's riding 
off the field with parcels of "pickaxes," "spades," "tents," or "tent-polos," 
on his horse. As though an officer with his reins in one hand and his 
sword in the other, would or could have, in the thick fight of such a 
retreat as that of Bunker Hill, such gear about him. These stories are 
neither consistent with a general's duty nor with a coward's fear. 

Such are the only two occasions where mention is made of any thing 
done when Colonel Prescott, up to about the hour of the attack, was in 
consultatalion with general officers. It is, however, now admitted, that he 
was the commander during the night of June 16th, and until the next 
day about two o'clock in the afternoon. He detached guards to the 
shores, convened his officers in council, applied directly to General Ward 
for reinforcements, and no general officer gave him an order. It is at the 
precise time when Generals Warren, Pomeroy and Putnam came on to 
the field that the command is said to have changed. But no authority 
states that General Ward ordered on one of these generals to supercede 
Prescott ; and that their volunteer presence, so far as the/«ci; is concerned, 
changed the command, is expressly denied by contemporary testimony. 
Besides, it is thoroughly refuted by Colonel Prescott's admirable letter 
giving an account of the action. This letter throws great light on the 
battle ; for it specifies, for the first time, important dispositions that were 
made, and important orders, that were given, ;ukI wlio guvc tiuin. It 



5'^ THL (OMMANn IN T»E 

indiontcs any thing ivithcr than a change of connnand at this precise time. 
If thia letter ischaractcrised by directness and modesty, it has also all a 
soldier's frankness. 

But there may be said to have been, in the action, a divided command. 
Colonel Prcscott's letter, in connection with another contemporary letter 
(July 22, 1773,) of almost equal interest and authority, written by Captain 
John Chester, an accomplished Connecticut officer in the battle, clearly 
shows this ; and, in fact, it is only necessary to put together a few passages 
from these two letters, which have so long lain in manuscript, to show 
minutely how it originated. At the time the British first landed, be- 
tween one and two o'clock, there had been but one position taken, (the 
small parties stationed in Charlestown, and, possibly, slight works just 
began on Bunker Hill, excepted) — namely, that of the first entrenchments, 
close together, on Bi-eed's Hill. Here were the Massachusetts troops 
and the two hundred Connecticut men, — the New Hampshire forces not 
having arrived. The enemy, on landing at Moulton's Point, immediately 
formed in three solid columns ; but soon there were indications that he 
intended to svirround the redoubt. It might have been as General Howe, 
with a party, reconnoitered the entrenchments, or on the appearance of a 
Hanking party. Colonel Prescott saw the necessity of a counteracting 
movement. But let the two letters tell the story. Chester says : " They 
(the British) were very near Mystic Kiver, and, by their movements, had 
determined to outflank our men and surround them and their fort. B at 
our officers in command, soon perceiving their intention, ordered a large 
party of men (chiefly Connecticut) to leave the fort, and march down and 
oppose the enemy's right wing." That is, the enemy appeared determined 
to move his right wing along the shore of Mystic Kiver and surround the 
fort, and this "large party" was detached to take a position to prevent 
him. Now Prescott says : " I ordered the train, with two field pieces, to 
go and oppose them (the British) and the Connecticut forces to support 
them." The train did not do the required service, but it was otherwise 
with the Connecticut forces. Chester adds : *' This they did, and had 
time to form somewhat regularly behind a fence half of stone and two 
rails of wood. Here nature had formed something of a breastwork, or 
else there had been a ditch many years agone. They grounded arms, and 
went to a neighboring parallel fence and brought rails, and made a slight 
fortification against musket ball." Now Samuel Gray, (July 12, 1775.) 
states that this party was under the command of Captain Thomas Knowl- 
ton. Here, then, is a clear, circumstantial and authentic contemporary 
account, which cannot be set aside. It teas Cohnel Prescott, not General 
Putnam, who gave the important order for Captain Knowlton to leave the 
fort and " oppose the enemy's right wing," which occasioned the con- 
struction of the rail fence breastMork that ran down to Mystic llivcr ; and 



BATTLE OF BUiNKEU HILL. oS 

to this iL^iilliint and noble soldier, of keen militarj' eye, who had admirable 
discretion as well as marked bravery, belongs the honor of beginning this 
celebrated defence. In a short time after it had been commenced, and 
while his men were thus occupied, Colonel Stark, and, closely following 
him, Colonel Reed, each at the head of a New Hampshire regiment, came 
on, took position here, and went on extending this work. General Put- 
nam also came here, and what more like him than that, as the companies 
were falling into line, and the British were slowly marching to the attack, 
he should ride about, and speak cheering words, and give them orders, 
and tell them how to place the rails, and exclaim, " Man the rail fence, 
for the enemy is flanking on us fast !" "Men, you are all marksmen ; 
don't any of you fire until you see the white of their eyes." Such facts 
are stated by several of the soldiers in their depositions. Indeed the 
evidence, with few exceptions, will agree well in fixing Putnam, on the 
first attack, at the rail fence. This attack was made about half past three. 
In this way, there had been two ^msltions taken, when the British 
made their assault, the last one — the rail fence — being at the base of Bun- 
ker Hill, some six hundred feet in the rear of the first one at Breed's 
Hill ; the diagonal line between the two being but slightly protected, if 
protected at all. It was General Howe's plan first to turn this last posi- 
tion, "to penetrtate" the rail fence by his light infantry, surround the fort, 
and cut off a retreat. Lieut. Page's plan of the battle, which has been ac- 
curately engraved for the Siege of Boston, by far the best plan, (so correct 
that its ground work finely agrees with Felton & Parker's excellent plan 
of Charlestown, taken in 1848,) has named on it the order in which it 
was intended the British troops should advance upon the redoubt, after 
this part of the defence had been forced. " But," says a British letter, 
July 5, 1775, "how could we penetrate? Most of our grenadiers and 
light infantry, the moment of presenting themselves, lost three fourths, 
and many nine-tenths of their men ; some had only eight and nine men 
u company left ; some only three, four, five." Another British letter 
says it "was found to be the strongest post ever occupied by any set 
of men." The noble service done here is universally acknowledged. 
General Putnam was here during the first attack, but after it he rode to 
the rear to urge on the reinforcements. Pomeroy, Stark, Reed, McClary 
and Knowlton, hoAvever, remained here during the battle, and towards 
the close they were joined by others. This brave band did not retreat 
until the main body under Prescott was obliged to leave the hill. 
Where all behaved so gallantly, it is delicate to name the most active of- 
ficer. After Putnam left. Colonel Stark was the senior officer, who had a 
special command. But there was little military order, or general com- 
mand here. Hence Colonel Stark, his son Major Stark, General Dear- 
born, and otliers, were in the huliit of stating that there was no general 



54 THK COMMAND IN THE 

command, and cvrn no efficient command at all, but that every one fought 
prctt)' much on his own hook. 

But Colonel Prescott did not go to the rail fence. Ills letter clearly war- 
rants the inference that, alter he ordered Captain Knowlton out of the 
fort, he had no intercourse with him or with the forces that took position 
there. Of Knowlton's party he says, they went "I suppose to Bunker 
Hill." (The rail fence was at the base of this hill.) Of the New Hamp- 
shire troops he says — "There was a party of Hampshire, in conjunction 
with some other forces, lined a fence at a distance of threescore rods back 
of the fort, partly to the north." The committee of safety account also 
indicates that this was a separate party. Other authorities are to the 
same point. Wilkinson, for instance, states that there was no concert or 
cooperation between the party at the fence and the main position at the 
redoubt. Pomeroy, Putnam, Stark, Knowlton, and other officers, named 
as being at the fence, are not named as being, during the battle, in the 
redoubt. But Colonel Prescott remained at the original entrenchments. 
Soon after he detached Captain Knowlton to the important duty assigned 
to him, he detached the lieutenant colonel and major of his own regi- 
ment for other duty. He says — "I commanded ray Lieut. Col. Robinson 
and Major Woods, each with a detachment, to flank the enemy, who, I 
have reason to think, behaved with prudence and courage." The deposi- 
tions of the soldiers are too confused to admit of a satisfactory detail of 
the movements of these two parties. The service performed by the brave 
Captain Walker, of Chelmsford, so far from being a reckless volunteer 
dash, was probably done by Prescott's order, and under one of those 
higher officers. The letter of Prescott mentions other particulars, indicat- 
ing independent command, and states that he kept •' the fort about one 
hour and twentj' minutes after the attack with small arms." He then 
gave the order to retreat. The first position was the important post of 
the day, the main object of the enemy ; and here Prescott remained cer- 
tainly the regular, responsible, authorized commander — "the proper com- 
manding officer," Heath writes, " during the whole action." Dr Eliot, I 
think, of all the contemporary authorities who name the officers, observes 
this distinction between the two positions. He says — "Colonel Prescott 
commanded the party within the lines, and Colonel Stark the men who 
were without, behind a rail fence." 

Now such efficient, uncontrolled, command — without, however, this 
discrimination — is positively asserted by the contemporary evidence and 
sustained by subsequent depositions. Thus James Thatcher says : " The 
incomparable Colonel Prescott marched at the head of the detachment, 
and though several general officers were present he retained the command 
during the action." John Pitts says : " No one appeared to have any 
command but Colonel Prescott, whose bravery can never be enough ac- 



BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. 55 

knowledged and applauded," Peter Thatcher says that he "commanded 
the provincials." William Tudor says " Colonel Prescott appeared to 
have been the chief." To this may be added subsequent statements. I 
select, here, only two. Judge Prescott states that no general officer •' ever 
exercised or claimed any authority or control over him, before or in the 
battle ;" and the anecdotes he gives, as woven into the narrative in the 
Siege of Boston, harmonize with this independent command. Several of 
the soldiers mention his efficiency in glowing terms. Thus the brave 
Captain Bancroft, in the redoubt, says : " He continued throughout the 
hottest of the fight to display admirable coolness and a self-possession that 
would do honor to the greatest hero of any age. He gave his orders 
deliberately, and how effectually they Avere obeyed I need not tell." What 
the estimate of his services by his contemporaries was, may be gathered 
from the enthusiastic remark of Samuel Adams, (Sept. 26, 1775,) — " Until 
I visited headquarters, at Cambridge, I never heard of the valor of Pres- 
cott at Bunker Hill." •' Too much praise," Heath also says, " can never 
be bestowed on the conduct of Colonel William Prescott." 

Colonel Prescott continued in the service through the year 1776 ; distin- 
guished himself again at the memorable retreat from the city of New York, 
and served under Gates at the capture of Burgoyne. He died at Pep- 
perell, Oct. 13, 1795. A simple tablet over his grave marks the place 
where his ashes repose. It is time that a monument worthy of his deeds 
should be erected to his memory. 

Such were the parts which general officers, on or off the field, perform- 
ed in this memorable battle. Colonel Prescott, acting under written 
orders, was regularly detailed for the service of fortifying Bunker Hill, and, 
from the time he ordered ground to be broken until he ordered the 
ground to be abandoned, he kept at the original entrenchments, and acted 
the part of a commanding officer, no general officer giving him an order, 
and none having been ordered to supercede him ; General Warren, a vol- 
unteer in spite of the aff"ection that would have kept him from the field, 
without having any special command, remained in the redoubt and fought 
side by side with Prescott ; General Pomeroy, fighting with a bravery 
worthy of his veteran renown, but with no special command, remained at 
the rail fence ; General Putnam, in the regular command of the Connecti- 
cut troops stationed at Cambridge, was active, energetic and fearless 
throughout, ordering them on to the field, giving orders to other troops, 
and aiding and encouraging, as a patriotic volunteer, wherever his ser- 
vices seem to have been required ; and General Ward, keeping at his 
headquarters, having frequent communication with the battle field, direct- 
ed the general movements of the troops to such a degree that, at the time, 
he was regarded as the responsible general commander. Such seems to 
be the conclusion which the evidence warrants. 



56 THE COMMAND IN TUF, 

Hut if to no one can bo assigned a general command of all the troops in 
the battle, yet to all may be justly and gratefully assigned the award of 
having done a great work, which made an immediate mark on events. 
The Americans were victorious enough to answer every purpose that was 
necessary for the good of their cause — the British were not beaten badly 
enough to prompt the ministry to resolve upon a crushing blow. Indeed, 
the importance of this service can hardly be overrated. The Americans, 
with defen-ics, soon to become so formidable, hardly commenced, for 
there were but slight defences on Cambridge road, and slighter still at 
lloxbury — with their inefficient organization— with their scanty supply 
of ammunition — were hardly in a condition to act either ofiensively or 
defensively ; while the ten thousand veterans in Boston, supplied with 
every art of war, were in high discipline, arrogant in their confidence, 
and exasperated at the presumption of the "rebel" force in pretending to 
hold them in a state of siege. Suppose Prescott, and Warren, and Pome- 
roy, and Putnam, bad been of less resolute hearts; suppose the patriot 
band instead of their steady valor, and wonderful execution, had made 
but a feeble defence and left the works ; suppose about three o'clock on 
the memorable seventeenth of June a panic had commenced on Breed's 
Hill — what might not have been the disastrous result ! The whole Brit- 
ish army in Boston was under arms and ready for any service. Only 
about a third of it, say three thousand, was in the first attack. Had Howe 
gone uninterruptedly forward, instead of the astounding repulse, and 
rushed over Bunker Hill, and so onward. General Gage would have 
seen that no more of his troops were needed there ; and the seven thousand 
remaining in Boston, with Clinton and Burgoyne to lead them, would 
have been ready for other work. It was no chimera of General Ward 
that the enemy might concentrate his force in Cambridge. 

But the work done on Breed's Hill stopped all this. In less than an 
hour and a half more than a thousand gallant British veterans, who cer- 
tainly behaved with remarkable courage, lay maimed or dead, on this 
bloody field. Such an unlooked for, astounding result, shook out of the 
British generals their arrogance and confidence, and changed boldness 
into timidity ; while it filled the Americans with nerve and resolution. 
Contemporary language, uttered in the camp, shows best the eff'cct of the 
action — "The battle has beer, of infinite service," writes one ; "Our troops 
are in high spirits and their resolution increases," writes another ; "I wish 
we could sell them another hill at the same price," writes a third. Wil- 
liam Tudor, (June 26, 177-),) tells the whole in a few words — "The unani- 
nious voice is, if the continent approve and assist, we will die or be free. 
The sword is drawn, and the scabbard thrown away, till it can be sheath- 
ed with security and honor." So true is the remark of Daniel Webster, 
that when the sun went down that day there could not be peace except 
on the basis of Amkrican IxnEPExnKNCE. 



XoTE. — Mr, Swett has made much account of the entry in Stiles's 
Diary of June 20, 177o. I therefore jiriut that portion of it relating to 
the Bunker Hill Battle :— 

" Jvme 20, 177-5. Mr. William EUcry came in last evening from I'ro- 
vidence, and showed me a copy of His Excellency Gen. Ward's letter of 
Saturday morning last, to the congress, informing the landing of the 
king's troops. Also a letter from the C'haraher of Supplies, and another 
fi-om Gen. Greene to lieut. (iov. Cook, dated on I,ord's day eAening, 
giving an account of the battle. Gen. (ireene says Gen. Putnam with 300 
))u-n took possession and entrenched on Bunker Ilill on Friday night the 
Kith. The Chamber of Supjilics says that Saturdny Moniiiif/ earlii. the 
A-iiif/'s troops landed on the hank of that hill, under discharge of cannon 
from the sliips of the line drawn up before Charlestown, and from the bat- 
t<'ry on Copp's Hill in Boston. That afterwards they attacked (ieneral 
Putnam, who defended himself with bravery till overi^owercd and obliged 
to retreat — that the loss was not ascertained, but more of the enemy was 
killed than of us. Gen. Greene says that Gen. Ward had published from 
head-quarters that our loss was about 40 killed and 100 wounded, and 
that the enemy's loss was judged three times as much. Greene seemed 
to doubt this at first, but from after enquiry, and considering that Putnam 
fired from the trenches, and that it was said the dead of the enemy cov- 
ored an acre of ground. Gen. Greene seemed rather to credit the superior 
loss of the regulars. 

Upon news of the action or landing, the congress instantly broke up, 
and those who had arms repaired to the field of action. Hence Dr. War- 
ren's being in the action where he fell dying gloriously. Otliers went off 
each way into the towns to rally and convene the militia, which poured 
in vast multitu.des to sustain the army if necessary. A cannonade was 
also began from the Neck, firing red-hot balls, ike. upon Roxbury. And 
this firing w'as continued all Saturday, Lord's day and yesterday, and 
Avas heard at Dighton, W^arren, &c. ;Mr. Cook, of TiA'crton, came from 
the camp, Avhere he yesterday morning was on Winter Hill, and there 
saw Gen. Putnam entrenching and in good spirits, being fully reinforced. 
All are expecting another action." 



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